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Every developing country wants its own stock exchange, and perhaps
this exuberance is well founded.' Indeed, if capital markets contribute to
economic growth, then the question of how to establish equity markets
should occupy a central position in the economic development field!
There are, of course, no authoritative directions on how to go about estab-
lishing and developing a stock market. One highly influential strand of
literature authored by Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei
Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny (hereinafter LLSV) has considered the
importance of legal system origin.3 This line holds that investor protec-
tion is the key to vibrant and efficient capital markets, and countries of
common law legal origin have corporate governance institutions that
1. Developing countries' desire for their own stock exchanges is sometimes attributed
to economic nationalism or sovereignty concerns. Promising companies can always list on
overseas exchanges and many do. However, recent findings show that investors display a
"home bias" by allocating a relatively large fraction of their wealth to equities issued by do-
mestic firms. This offers some validation to a country's impulse for its own domestic
exchange. See Kalok Chan et al., What Determines the Domestic Bias and Foreign Bias? Evi-
dence from Mutual Fund Equity Allocations Worldwide, 60 J. FIN. 1495 (2005).
2. While studies have not conclusively established whether economic growth causes
stock market development or whether stock market development causes economic growth,
certainly there seems to be a positive relationship between the two. Findings suggest interde-
pendency: economic growth feeds off of stock market development and vice versa. See Ross
Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 537
(1998) (showing that stock market liquidity and banking development positively predict
growth); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 AM.
ECON. REV. 559 (1998) (setting forth a reasonable thesis to prove a causal relationship be-
tween stock market development and economic growth).
3. The key LLSV articles are Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei
Shleifer, What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006); Rafael La Porta, Florencio
Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POLUT. EcON.
1113 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Law & Finance]; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-
de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, & Robert W. Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52
J. FIN. 1131 (1997) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Legal Determinants].
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provide superior investor protection. Countries of civil law legal origin,
on the other hand, generally have lower levels of investor protection and
less vibrant capital markets. While the findings of LLSV reveal correla-
tion between investor protection indicators and stock market
performance, their methodology neglects any real consideration of
causal links. In a similar vein, Professor Bernard Black has offered a list
of "core" institutions necessary for well-functioning stock markets, and
he explains how these institutions contribute to the efficient allocation of
capital.6 The emphasis on institutions in these seminal articles operates
on a highly abstract level. Much of the law and finance literature draws
generalizations based on the experiences of developed, capitalist econo-
mies, positioned in democratic, rule-of-law-based political systems. The
most glaring omission is a general failure to address "transition econo-
mies."7 These studies have excluded two of the most consequential
economies in the world: China and India.
Disregarding China is immensely convenient for law and finance
scholars. China is not a common law country-nor is it reliably catego-
rized as a civil law country. It has a political system which is neither
democratic nor characterized by rule of law. However, given its increas-
ing importance in the global economy, worldwide capital markets, and
world trading system, China is simply too important to dismiss as an
inconsequential outlier.
China has seen extraordinary economic growth over the past three
decades, the development of booming equity markets, and high value
participation by Chinese issuers in offshore capital markets. According
to one estimate, market capitalization of companies listed on China's
domestic exchanges increased at an average rate of 63.3 percent per year
between 1992 and 2003.8 In 2003, total market capitalization was 36.4
4. See La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 3, at 1137 (showing that anti-
director rights measures are highest in common law countries, intermediate in Scandinavian
and German civil law countries, and lowest in French civil law countries).
5. La Porta et al., Law & Finance, supra note 3, at 1116 (finding a strong negative
correlation between concentration of ownership, as measured by the combined stake of the
three largest shareholders, and the quality of legal protection of investors); La Porta et al.,
Legal Determinants, supra note 3, at 1137 (showing that low shareholder protection may be
the reason why some legal origins have smaller equity markets as well as lower access to
equity finance).
6. See Bemard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securi-
ties Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781 (2001).
7. La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 3, at 1117 ("There are no socialist or
'transition' economies in the sample.").
8. Lihui Tian & Saul Estrin, Debt Financing, Soft Budget Constraints, and Govern-
ment Ownership: Evidence from China, 15 ECON. TRANSITION 461, 464-65 (2007). Any
measure of market capitalization for Chinese listed companies during this timeframe is prob-
lematic. See infra Part HI.C.
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percent of China's gross domestic product (GDP).9 The number of
Chinese-listed companies grew from fifty-three companies in 1992 to
851 in 1998 to 1,287 in 2003. '0 Notably, the largest IPO in history was
the dual listing of a Chinese company on the Shanghai and Hong Kong
stock exchanges." Until quite recently, however, China's law and
institutions, including investor protection and corporate governance,
were significantly less developed than almost all countries in the LLSV
sample. 12 Enforcement of law and governance norms has been
problematic, as is common in developing countries. 3 In the Chinese
case, robust stock market development has been coupled with
underdeveloped securities law and regulation, weak legal institutions,
and spotty enforcement. China's experience therefore represents a
puzzle."
9. Id.
10. Id. There has been a good deal of debate about the relevance of China's capital
markets to the country's economic growth, with many arguing that they are not nearly as im-
portant as bank financing. See, e.g., Franklin Allen et al., Law, Finance and Economic Growth
in China, 77 J. FIN. EcON. 57, 73 (2005) ("Both the scale and relative importance (compared
with other channels of financing) of China's external markets are not significant."); Donald C.
Clarke, The Ecology of Corporate Governance in China 17 (George Washington Univ. Law
Sch. Pub. & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 433, 2008), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1245803 (last visited June 28, 2009) ("[M]uch writing on them unsurpris-
ingly assumes that [China's stock markets] are critical to the Chinese economy. At least until
recently, this assumption is questionable."). The loans made by Chinese banks are hardly ex-
emplars of efficient capital allocation. Thus, the capital markets have an important role to play
in sustaining China's record-setting growth rate.
11. In 2006, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) was simultaneously
listed on both the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and Shanghai Stock Exchange. ICBC raised at
least USD $14 billion in Hong Kong H-shares and another USD $5.1 billion in Shanghai
A-shares, making it the largest IPO in world history. See Richard McGregor et al., China's Big-
gest Bank Goes to Market, FIN. IMES, Oct. 24, 2006, available at http://us.ft.com/
ftgateway/superpage.ft?news-id=fto102420061415242175&page=2 (last visited July 24, 2009).
12. See infra app. tbl. 1.
13. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 35 (1990). "[T]he inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforce-
ment of contracts is the most important source of both historical stagnation and contemporary
underdevelopment in the Third World." Id. at 54; see, e.g., Nicholas Bloom et al., Contract
Enforcement and Firm Organization: Evidence from the Indian Textile Industry (Mar. 4, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (detailing how poor law enforcement in
India discourages executives from delegating responsibilities to middle management, which
directly limits firms' productivity and expansion); Dhammika Dharmapala & Vikramaditya
Khanna, Corporate Governance, Enforcement, and Firm Value: Evidence from India (Univ. of
Mich. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 08-005, 2008), available at http://ssm.coml
abstract=] 105732 (last visited June 28, 2009) (showing that substantive corporate governance
reforms contributed to the value of listed companies in India but only after the enactment of
severe sanctions for non-complying firms).
14. This puzzle is in a sense subsidiary to the broader Chinese exception to the "rights
hypothesis," an influential theory in institutional economics that economic growth requires
stable and predictable contract and property rights. See generally Donald C. Clarke, Economic
1276 [Vol. 30:1273
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This Note offers a partial explanation to this puzzle. I argue that dur-
ing the first decade of stock market development (roughly 1990-2000)
Chinese institutions, which emphasized administrative direction and
control, functioned in lieu of legal and financial institutions. Preexisting
modes of administrative governance introduced incentives that mitigated
information asymmetry problems inherent in initial public offerings
(IPOs) and contributed to enhanced market valuation during the post-
IPO phase. 5 I focus on two sui generis Chinese institutions employed
during this time period: the quota system for equity share issuance and
the Special Treatment (ST) system for underperforming issuers. In short,
my thesis is that administrative governance substituted for corporate
governance.
I do not suggest that the incentive structures surrounding the quota
system and the ST system constitute a superior method of securities
regulation and corporate governance compared with the mechanisms of
investor protection emphasized in the LLSV literature or the well-known
institutions outlined by Professor Bernard Black. I would question the
utility of Chinese administrative governance for efficient allocation of
capital in the medium to long term. During the early years of China's
experiment with stock markets, however, these institutions filled a void
and jump-started the markets in a way that newly introduced laws (man-
datory disclosure and criminal and civil liability) and immature
institutions (courts, market regulators, and intermediaries) could not. My
Note pushes back on the notion that developing countries should em-
brace any set of predetermined institutions wholesale-certainly not
Anglo-American common law institutions transplanted from a radically
different political-legal context. 6 Any program designed to build a stock
market should first look to integrate indigenous institutions and practices.
Even institutions born of socialist-era, centralized state planning-at first
blush the very antithesis of market-based development-may contribute
to the growth of viable capital markets. 7
Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The China Problem, 51 Am. J. CoMP. L. 89, 89
(2003) (refining the rights hypothesis through discussion of the Chinese case).
15. My analysis draws directly upon the excellent empirical work done by Katharina
Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons from
China, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 184 (2005) (examining the impact of China's quota system for
equity shares), and Julan Du et al., Special Treatment (ST) Firms and Administrative Govern-
ance of Capital Markets in China, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW IN CHINA 164 (Thomas
Eger et al. eds., 2007) (examining the impact of the ST system and delisting).
16. For these reasons, generic recommendations, such as the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-Operation and Development's (OECD) Principles of Corporate Governance, may
have only limited utility. See OECD, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2004), avail-
able at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf (last visited June 28, 2009).
17. Professor Black and his co-authors have admitted that "enterprise leasing," a home-
grown, Russian plan whereby the State retains ownership of the enterprise yet managers are
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This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of the
so-called "core" institutions necessary for functioning stock markets.
Part II introduces the Chinese case and outlines several relevant features
of China's financial markets, many of which arise from the legacy of
state-ownership and the planned economy. Part III frames the Chinese
puzzle by examining the record of robust stock market performance
alongside clearly dysfunctional legal and financial institutions. Part IV
details two examples of administrative governance as corporate govern-
ance: the quota system and the ST system.
I. CORE INSTITUTIONS
Information asymmetry and self-dealing are the two major threats to
strong financial markets. 8 Core institutions counter these threats.' 9 This
Part discusses the ways in which information asymmetry and self-
dealing manifest in the market. The Part also introduces five core institu-
tions that ideally assure investors that the information they receive is
accurate and that company insiders are looking to create value for the
issuer firm.
Securities represent claims to a company's future income. The pre-
sent value of a company's securities depends on that company's future
prospects . Past performance often indicates future performance' Insid-
ers, such as managers and controlling shareholders, are intimately
familiar with their company's past performance and future prospects.
They must share this information in order for investors to value the com-
pany's securities accurately. 22 Since investors cannot directly verify the
accuracy of the company reported information, insiders are incentivized
to exaggerate the issuer's prospects and divert company capital for their
personal consumption.23 In the context of an initial public offering, this
incentive to misappropriate the cash raised by the sale of stock is known
as the "promoter problem. 24 The promoter problem is a classic out-
given material incentives to improve performance, might very well have led to a better solu-
tion for Russia. See Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance:
What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1784 (2000) ("The privatizers killed enterprise
leasing in 1992, so we don't know how it would have turned out. But we know how it started,
and the start was promising.").
18. See Black, supra note 6, at 783.
19. Id. at 789 (introducing the concept of "core" institutions).




24. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62
U. Cm. L. REV. 1047, 1049 (1995).
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growth of "vertical agency costs" between company insiders and outside
investors, where the insider is the agent of the capital-providing inves-
tor.
25
Similarly, insiders may use their influence over company decision-
making and misappropriate company value to themselves, their relatives,
or another insider-controlled company.26 They typically do this by engag-
ing in non-arm's-length transactions (direct self-dealing) or by using
insider information to trade with less informed investors (indirect self-
dealing or insider trading). 27 Self-dealing, also known as the "controller's
problem," is a consequence of "horizontal agency costs" between the
dominant and minority shareholders, where principal and agent are, un-
der law, co-equals.
Problems arising from agency costs can undermine the viability of a
country's financial markets. 29 If investors cannot trust a company's
reported information or the insiders who control the company, they will
discount the prices that they are willing to pay for those companies'
securities to reflect that risk.3 ° Under these circumstances, honest issuers
will not receive fair value for their shares and, consequently, they will
look to sources of financing other than the equity markets. High quality
issuers will exit and leave the market populated by low-quality issuers.3'
Investors will further discount the prices they are willing to pay, causing
more of the quality firms to flee and creating a "death spiral. 32
25. For a discussion of the "horizontal" and "vertical" dimensions of corporate govern-
ance, see Mark J. Roe, The Institutions of Corporate Governance (Harvard Univ. John M. Oin
Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 488, 2004), available at http://ssm.coml
abstract=612362 (last visited July 12, 2009).
26. The insiders' incentive to act opportunistically is an example of "moral hazard." See
PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 195
(1992) (defining moral hazard as "any behavior under a contract that is inefficient, arises from
... differing interests ... and persists only because one party to the contract cannot tell for
sure whether the other is honoring the contracting terms").
27. Black, supra note 6, at 804 (distinguishing between direct and indirect self-
dealing).
28. See Roe, supra note 25, at 2. The problem of horizontal agency costs is the central
concern of corporate governance throughout most of the world, where equity ownership is
generally concentrated and external finance is oriented toward bank-provided credit. The
United States, where public company ownership is more dispersed and the problem of vertical
agency costs predominates, is an outlier.
29. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 276, 280 (1991) (noting that unless investors can discern the relative




32. In the economist jargon, this downward spiral is known as a "market for lemons"
problem. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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Disclosure, reputational intermediaries, liability standards, courts, and a
public regulator serve to mitigate this threat.
A. Disclosure
Disclosure generally refers to two distinct concepts: to the corporate
law notion of disclosure to shareholders prior to their approval of corpo-
rate actions, such as a merger; and to initial and ongoing public
disclosure of corporate information as required by the securities laws.33
Disclosure is probably the least controversial of the five core institutions.
Traditionally, proponents stressed fairness rationales for mandating dis-
closure, but perhaps the strongest rationales are efficiency-based.34 The
analysis below sketches out the five main policy arguments that underpin
a mandatory disclosure regime.
1. Information as a Public Good
The efficiency-based rationales for mandatory disclosure hinge on
the fact that information about public companies displays many of the
characteristics of a public good.35 The key characteristic of a public good
is non-excludability.36 People benefit from public goods regardless of
whether or not they contributed to the cost of acquiring the good. More-
over, consumption of a public good does not diminish the good's
availability to others." This leads to a situation where people can
free-ride on the contributions of others. The potential for free-riders dis-
courages anyone from paying for the public good. The paradoxical result
is that goods that most people would consider to be vital are woefully
underprovided absent regulation."
Since market forces are inadequate to produce a socially optimal
supply of information about public companies, a regulatory response is
justified. By mandating that issuers disclose key information, society
33. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 29, at 276 (referring to disclosure "before
collecting proxies from investors" regarding a corporate action and "before selling securities"
to the investing public).
34. For a repudiation of fairness-based justifications for mandatory disclosure, see id. at
296-300.
35. Public goods include public parks, clean air, and national defense. For an important
discussion of this concept, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 14 (1965) (defining public good as a benefit or good
accruing to all of a group's membership).
36. Id. at 15.
37. Id. at 14.
38. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 133-34 (1959)
("The basic problem in the theory of public economy ... is that the same amounts of [public]
services are consumed by all, so that (1) true individual preference for such wants are not
revealed at the market, and (2) there is not a single solution that is optimal in the Pareto
sense.").
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effectively subsidizes securities analysts. 9 Analysts' marginal cost of
acquiring and verifying information decreases, and for their part, ana-
lysts rationally increase the quantity of information they disclose.40 With
mandatory disclosure as a cost-saving measure, over time, new analysts
should enter the market, and competition among analysts should also• 41
lead to greater quality of information. Ideally, the end result is im-
provement in the capital market's allocative efficiency and increased
investment in productive firms.
2. Reducing Agency Costs
Agency cost problems can push a country's capital markets toward a
death spiral. Outside investors have difficulty monitoring the perform-
ance of managers and insiders. However, mandatory disclosure can
moderate corporate misfeasance. Agency costs are reduced when insid-
ers disclose shareholdings, executive compensation, and, most
importantly, related-party transactions.
Disclosure does not eliminate the ability of insiders to profit from di-
rect or indirect self-dealing. Rather, mandatory disclosure alters the
relationship between outside investors and insiders whereby information
about related-party transactions comes to light on an ongoing basis, and
inefficiencies associated with these questionable transactions become
embedded in the company's share price.43 Mandatory disclosure is "con-
tract inducing." The rule saves parties from incurring transaction costs
while negotiating disclosure content in every particular corporate in-
stance.
3. Resolving Coordination Problems
Misleading information often enters financial data. Absent contract-
ing costs, investors would require all firms to identify and use one
optimal format of disclosure.4 '5 However, no one firm could justify the
46costs of doing so. Free-rider firms would use the format, and so the
39. John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for Mandatory Disclo-
sure, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 728 (1984).
40. Id. at 729.
41. Id.
42. See Mahoney, supra note 24, at 1048 (arguing that the "principle purpose" of man-
datory disclosure is addressing the misalignment of interests between promoters and investors
or managers and shareholders).
43. Under this contractual formulation, Mahoney posits that the promoter (or insider)
"sells" his expertise to investors. Id. at 1091.
44. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36
J.L. & ECON. 425, 444 (1993).
45. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 29, at 290-92.
46. Id.
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creator company's efforts would go under-compensated. Such a lan-
guage would essentially be a public good.
State intervention and imposition of a set of regulatory schedules
and accounting standards resolves the problem of coordinating a com-
mon language of disclosure. Introducing a uniform system of reporting
allows for comparisons among similar companies and limits managers'
abilities to cherry-pick reporting and accounting practices to make their
firm appear more profitable.47
4. Minimizing the Cost of Duplicative Research
When information about public companies is easily accessible and
accurate, investors will gravitate toward good companies, the market will
allocate capital efficiently, and entrepreneurs will be able to raise capital
for wealth-creating projects, This is beneficial from a social welfare per-
spective. Trading gains made in the secondary market, however,
generally do not create additional wealth,4 as one party's gain is an-
other's loss. 49 The resources expended by either party in determining
whether to make a trade constitute social waste. ° Mandatory information
disclosure reduces these costs. Rival investment firms do not incur du-
plicative data banks on a certain stock; instead, they can access a state-
maintained central information depository.5'
5. Positive Externalities
The analysis thus far has hinted at the beneficial externalities when
one firm commits to information disclosure. However, disclosure is
costly, and, absent rules mandating it, free-rider problems discourage
disclosure and exacerbate information asymmetries between firms and
investors. This reduces firm value.52 The first positive externality is that
mandatory disclosure allows each firm's results to inform the market
about other firms' values and by extension improves liquidity for a popu-
lation of firms.53 Admati & Pfleiderer have argued that a related but
distinct externality arises when a company improves its liquidity through
disclosure: if firm A lowers the cost of trading its stock, it may increase
47. Id. at 289-90.
48. Coffee, Jr., supra note 39, at 733.
49. Id.
50. See generally Jack Hirschleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and
the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971).
51. Coffee, Jr., supra note 39, at 733-34.
52. See Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, Forcing Firms to Talk: Financial Disclosure
Regulation and Externalities, 13 REv. FIN. STUD. 479, 479-80 (2000) (demonstrating that the
Nash equilibrium of a voluntary disclosure game is often socially inefficient).
53. Id. at 513.
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the willingness of investors to buy firm B's stock by decreasing the cost
of adjusting a portfolio to account for changes in firm B's risk profile.5
The beneficial effects of mandatory, ongoing disclosure therefore perco-
late throughout the market.
B. Reputational Intermediaries
Reputational intermediaries, such as investment banks, accounting
firms, and law firms, perform a crucial role in combating information
asymmetry and assuring investors that they will not be defrauded." The
problem is "particularly acute" when dealing with an initial issuance of
securities. Buyers must be convinced of the information's accuracy and
the issuer's good faith. However, pre-sale verification is costly, and
complete verification is probably impossible. From a one-time seller's
perspective, the gains from opportunism may exceed the cost of a reputa-
tion for thievery.
Reputational intermediaries can credibly vouch for issuers because
the intermediaries are repeat players. 7 A reputable investment bank, for
example, has accrued reputational capital by bringing different firms to
the public over many years. In theory, a bank would not aid in fraud and
sacrifice such reputational capital for a one-time, relatively modest fee.5
Thus, the underwriter in a securities issuance transaction effectively
"rents" its reputation to the issuer. 9 The investment bank may purchase
an issuer's entire offering, as part of a "firm commitment" underwriting,
before reselling the securities to investors. Alternatively, it may engage
in a "best efforts" style underwriting receiving a commission on each
security sold but without taking true ownership risk.60 In either case, the
name of the underwriter (or syndicate of underwriters) inspires confi-
dence and helps ensure the success of the offering. Knowledge that a
reputable law firm has compiled the prospectus and that a reputable ac-
counting firm has audited the financial statements similarly assuages
54. Id. The "argument assumes that investors are heterogeneous. Otherwise, they would
have no reason to trade." Id. at 513 n.28.
55. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Effi-
ciency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 619-21 (1984).
56. Id. at 620.
57. Id.
58. But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers,
Stupid", 57 Bus. L. 1403 (2002) (exploring why reputational intermediaries sometimes acqui-
esce in managerial fraud, even though the potential reputational loss obviously exceeds the
gains made from the individual client).
59. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 55, at 620.
60. STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
ANALYSIS 419-20 (2d ed. 2008).
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investors.6 By lowering investor verification costs, reputational interme-
diaries allow the issued securities to fetch a higher price than they might
otherwise.
C. Liability Standards
Markets cannot work properly if they are not informed about wrong-
doing. If offering documents routinely misstate or omit important details
about a company's performance, investors will be unable to rationally
distinguish high-value companies from low-value companies. This will
trigger the adverse selection or death spiral effect. Law-based institutions
must force dissemination of information.62 To combat the impulses to
cheat among issuers as well as secondary actors, a mandatory disclosure
regime must impose calibrated penalties for misrepresentation or ma-
nipulation. The threat of liability provides credibility to disclosure.
1. Issuer and Insider Liability
Issuer and insider liability is the first line of defense against fraud.63
Mandatory disclosure is not always completely truthful, accurate, or
comprehensive. The market provides some minimal checks on insiders'
behavior. Although insiders will be tempted to conceal the truth about
their company during a public offering or renege on promises made at
the time of issuance (e.g., use of proceeds), the company will probably
want to re-access the capital market to issue more securities. 6 Further-
more, insiders will probably want to sell their own shares in the future.
Market-imposed constraints alone, however, do not adequately deter
misbehavior for three reasons. First, depending on enforcement capacity
of the market regulator and prosecutor, the probability of detection may
be quite low.6 1 Second, the misappropriated value may not be large rela-
61. Black, supra note 6, at 787.
62. Roe, supra note 25, at 13.
63. Black, supra note 6, at 796. To the extent that corporations may purchase insurance
coverage and pass the cost of securities fraud along to shareholders, insider liability is particu-
larly important for deterrence purposes. Of course, insiders may contract to be indemnified by
the corporation or purchase director's and officer's insurance, similarly imposing the cost of
their misfeasance on shareholders. For a discussion on remedying these conundrums in the
U.S. context, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on
Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1572-85 (2006).
64. Black, supra note 6, at 796.
65. Even the SEC, widely considered a robust and well-funded regulator, "does not
have the resources to investigate every instance in which a public company's disclosure is
questionable... [t]his would continue to be the case even if the Commission's resources were
substantially increased." See Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking Housing & Urban Af-
fairs, 103d Cong. 5 (1993) (statement of William R. McLucas, Dir. of Enforcement, Sec.
Exch. Comm'n); see also Bemer v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The re-
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tive to the firm's size and therefore may have only a negligible impact on
share price. 66 Finally, insiders may be desperate for funds, and if they do
not lie or cheat, there will be no subsequent financing. In sum, reputa
tional sanctions do not effectively police the moral hazard faced by
insiders.68
The standard of liability directly affects the ease and frequency
whereby the public regulator or private litigants (if they are so empow-
ered) can bring enforcement actions.69 The standard may require mere
proof of a material misstatement or omission in the offering documents.
Substantive law may go further and require that investors show reliance
on that statement or omission, and that it caused them a loss. Finally, the
law may require showing that insiders' acts constituted negligence or
gross negligence. 70 Civil liability contributes to deterrence, but without
more it is inadequate because "insiders often have little wealth outside
their firm.,,71 Insiders can also hide or spend most of their gain.72 For
these reasons, criminal and administrative sanctions have a significant
role to play.
In addition to deterrence, liability also serves a compensatory role.
Civil liability functions to "make whole" the investors that have been
cheated. As a starting point, the damages calculation might begin as the
difference between what the investor paid for the security and the
security's "true" value (absent the fraud) at the time of the purchase.73
However, depending on the concentration of an individual shareholder's
equity ownership, this loss may seem relatively insignificant in
comparison to the costs of litigation. Moreover, to adjust for the
movement of the market as a whole, the quantum of this loss is generally
narrowed by the percentage decline of a market index during the relevant
time period.74 If the parties decide to settle, investors will recover an even
smaller share of their losses. Although the civil litigation costs may
sources of the Securities Exchange Commission are adequate to prosecute only the most fla-
grant abuses.") (internal citation omitted).
66. Roe, supra, note 25, at 13.
67. As a matter of game theory, this third scenario describes the final round of a repeat
game. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
68. See MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 26, at 166-204.
69. See Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 931,941 (2003).
70. Id. ("Requiring intent or negligence or imposing strict liability can further circum-
scribe the scope of liability... ").
71. Black, supra note 6, at 797.
72. Id.
73. This measure has been described as "net out-of-pocket" (NOP). See Mary E. Cal-
houn et al., The Calculation of Damages in Securities Arbitration, in SECURITIES
ARBITRATION 2001: How Do I Do IT? How Do I Do IT BETTER? 1060, 1069 (2001).
74. Id. at 1083-84.
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sometimes exceed recovery, shareholders' suits also have an important
role to play.
2. Secondary Actor Liability
Liability for secondary actors (reputational intermediaries) provides
a second line of defense against fraud. Intermediaries have an incentive
to gamble their firm's reputation to gain or keep a client or, if paid
enough, to win fees.7 As with issuers, intermediaries will weigh the
probability of getting caught times the cost of punishment against the
benefit of the client's business. The "risk of liability reinforces [an in-
termediary's] concern for reputation." 76 Liability can persuade an
investment bank, for example, to turn away an issuer of marginal credi-
bility: risk of liability supplies accountants with a response to clients that
want less intrusive audits, and lawyers with a response to clients that
want more favorable disclosure than the law allows.77 The same liability
standards that apply to issuers and insiders may also apply to secondary
actors.
3. Procedural Support Mechanisms
Meaningful liability depends upon rules of procedure..7 The law will
deter bad actors only if they are held accountable for their violations.
The analysis below briefly sketches three procedural arrangements that
work together to support a plaintiff's ability to bring suit.
a. A Mechanism to Combine Shareholders' Claims
A group action mechanism enables shareholders that have been
harmed to join their claims and have them resolved together. The aggre-
gation of losses makes it possible to compensate numerous victims who
individually have been harmed in amounts too small to warrant an indi-
vidual suit. Without such a mechanism, shareholders are beset by a
collective action problem and, in the unlikely event that a shareholder
makes it to the courthouse, individual suits are administratively ineffi-
cient.7 9
75. See Black, supra note 6, at 794.
76. Id. at 794-96.
77. See id. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 17 C.ER. § 205.3(b) (2003),
imposes a higher standard of liability upon securities lawyers that fail to "report up the ladder"
nondisclosure that would constitute a material violation.
78. Black, supra note 6, at 791.
79. Id. ("It's important to have class actions or another way to combine many individu-
ally small claims.").
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b. Contingency Fee Arrangements
The contingent fee drives private enforcement and group action liti-
gation. A contingency fee has two components: payment is contingent on
the outcome of the litigation, and the fee is a percentage deducted from
the clients' recovery.8° A contingent fee contract's primary purpose is to
allow plaintiffs who cannot afford a lawyer to obtain legal services by
compensating the lawyer with the proceeds of any recovery.8 Individual
investors generally will not be willing to incur the costs of a complex
lawsuit to recover only a small private loss. Coupled with the group ac-
tion mechanism, the prospect of a percentage of all investors' aggregated
losses incentivizes plaintiffs' lawyers to pursue the litigation.
c. Broad Civil Discovery
Proving false disclosure often requires uncovering evidence buried
in an issuer's records.82 A false disclosure in the prospectus or a periodic
report provides a natural starting place for the paper trail. Cases of self-
dealing, however, are typically more difficult to prove." Broad civil dis-
covery allows for aggrieved shareholders to credibly threaten action and
succeed in civil litigation and, in either case, play a private enforcement
role.
D. Courts
Every legal system must allocate power to make and enforce the law.
Lawmaking is typically conducted by legislatures and, particularly in
common law countries, by courts. Law pronounced by either of these
institutions cannot anticipate all possible permutations of human
conduct. Liability standards, such as negligence, still leave open the
question of what actions will trigger a breach.84 New and unforeseen
cases continually arise.85 Since the standards' precise contours are
ambiguous, an individual contemplating the legal ramifications of his
conduct has two options: to proceed anyway, assuming that the law will
not apply, or not to act, believing that the mere possibility of punishment
86justifies inaction. Either case embodies suboptimal levels of
80. See generally Task Force on Contingent Fees, Tort Trial and Insurance Practice
Section of the American Bar Association, Report on Contingent Fees in Class Acton Litiga-
tion, 25 REv. LITIG. 459 (2006).
81. See id. at 464.
82. Black, supra note 6, at 791.
83. Id. at 807.
84. Pistor & Xu, supra note 69, at 941.
85. See id. (describing so-called "Type I incomplete law").
86. See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
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deterrence . Because law is often inherently "incomplete," the power to
interpret and develop law so that it applies to new cases must also be
allocated.88 Courts, and at times a public regulator, may take on this
residual "lawmaking" role.89
In common law systems, courts are vested with original lawmaking
power, while in civil law systems, judges are said to interpret and not
"make" law.90 The notion of residual lawmaking implies that the wording
of the relevant statute does not directly apply to a particular set of facts.
A civil law judge who "interprets" the statute to apply essentially serves
a residual lawmaking function. In theory, civil law judges are less con-
strained than common law judges in their application of law because
they are not bound by the rule of precedent.9' However, in civil as well as
common law courts, the formal distinction between lawmaking and law
interpretation often breaks down. Courts in both systems fill the gaps not
expressly codified in law.
Courts differ from regulators in the process and timing of their re-
sidual lawmaking power.92 Under the general principle of equality before
the law, courts are designed to be "neutral arbiters." They are passive and
only adjudicate claims brought by private parties or the State in a crimi-
nal prosecution.93 Plaintiffs may ask a court to prevent harmful actions
from taking place by filing for a preliminary injunction. However, gener-
ally, courts function as lawmakers ex post, reacting only after the harm
has occurred.
87. Precisely for this reason, some commentators have provocatively argued that in an
environment with weak enforcement "no law is better than good law." The "suboptimal level
of deterrence" alluded to here is akin to the enforcement Prisoner's Dilemma illustrated in
Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, When No Law Is Better Than Good Law, 13 REv. FIN.
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=558021 (last visited June 28, 2009).
88. Pistor & Xu, supra note 69, at 933-34.
89. Id. at 947.
90. There is considerable debate about whether common law judges "make" law or
merely "find" law based on legal principles. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Tom Ginsburg,
Comparative Judicial Discretion: An Empirical Test of Economic Models, 16 INT'L REv. L. &
ECON. 295 (analyzing the "daringness" of judges in different legal systems); Jack G. Day, Why
Judges Must Make Law, 26 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 563, 563-65 (1976).
91. In practice, lower courts, even in a civil law system, usually adhere to prior rulings
of superior courts to avoid being overruled. Nonetheless, the LLSV literature suggests that
civil law countries' courts are less helpful to investors than their common law counterparts.
See La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 3, at 1140 ("[A] strong system of legal en-
forcement could substitute for weak rules since active and well-functioning courts can step in
and rescue investors abused by the management.").
92. Pistor & Xu, supra note 69, at 948.
93. Id.
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E. The Public Regulator
In contrast to courts, the public regulator can make and enforce law
proactively.94 While courts must remain passive and wait for private par-
ties to bring suit, the regulator may intervene on its own initiative to
control market entry, monitor and investigate market actors, and enjoin
and sanction violators. The regulator employs its residual law-making
power (i.e., rulemaking) and its enforcement power "both ex post and ex
ante."95 So long as the regulator stays within the scope of its statutory
powers, it retains a high degree of flexibility.96 Legislatures, in contrast,
face procedural constraints and higher costs when changing the law.
97
Public regulation comes with significant costs. An administrative
agency requires funding to hire monitors and investigators, maintain a
filing system, and launch enforcement actions if so empowered. 9 Over
or under-regulation by the regulator also imposes indirect societal costs.99
Over-regulation exists when the costs of proactive ex ante law enforce-
ment outweigh the benefits. Regulation may, for example, enjoin too
many potentially beneficial actions and stifle economic activity.' °0 Un-
der-regulation exists when the regulator, often as a result of resource
constraints or misallocation, fails to respond to harmful actions. Finally,
agencies are more susceptible to capture because agencies deal with the
same industry players on a daily basis while courts deal with a more dis-
persed population. A regulator may favor certain influential entities (e.g.,
future employers), extract bribes from regulated parties, and punish po-
litical opponents.
F. A Web of Institutions
Part One has described an integrated set of institutions designed to
check the negative effects of information asymmetry and self-dealing.
Multiple reputational intermediaries vouch for different aspects of a
company's disclosure. A public regulator and private investors, assisted
by the courts and through enforcement actions, police issuers and secon-
dary actors. The complexity of this web helps explain the difficulties
94. Id.
95. Id. at 949.
96. Id. at 950.
97. Id.
98. For this reason, Jackson & Roe have argued for a "resource based" measure of
public enforcement. See Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement
of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence (Harvard Pub. Law Working Paper No. 08-28,
2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1000086 (last visited June 28, 2009) (settling on
staffing levels and budgets as proxies for oversight of capital markets in an inter-country com-
parative study of public versus private enforcement).
99. Id. at 5-6.
100. Pistor & Xu, supra note 69, at 951.
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faced by countries such as the Czech and Slovak Republics, Lithuania,
and Romania, all of which attempted to create capital markets by trans-
planting these institutions post-socialism. '0' "Shock therapy"-the
dominant policy prescription for transition economies of the 1990s-
called upon countries to privatize and, frequently, to list all former
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on national exchanges in a highly acceler-
ated fashion.'0 2 The Western advocates of mass privatization did not
sufficiently appreciate the enormity of the institution-building task before
them or whether, in fact, "core" institutions fit the target country's preex-
isting institutional mix.'0 With these experiences in mind, the remainder
of this Note discusses the Chinese case and the indigenous institutions
that have helped China develop increasingly vibrant capital markets and
issuers able to raise capital across the globe.
II. CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS
There is something about stock markets-archetypal symbols of
capitalism-in an ostensibly Communist China that presents an intellec-
tually tantalizing riddle. Officially constituted as the Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock exchanges in 1990 and 1991 respectively, national-level
stock markets arrived in China more than a decade after the initiation of
Deng Xiaoping's Opening-up and Reform Program. '4 The advent of
China's stock markets did not coincide with privatization; far from it,
"until 2000 about two-thirds of all listed company shares were owned by
various government entities."'05 In the late 1990s, the government was
the dominant shareholder in 43.9 percent of listed firms, and in about
one-third of these, the government owned a stake greater than 50 per-
cent.'°6
These numbers suggest that China's stock market was created first
and foremost as a tool for SOE financing and reform, and not as a means
of offering members of the general public a way to diversify their in-
101. Anete Pajuste, Corporate Governance and Stock Market Performance in Central
and Eastern Europe: A Study of Nine Countries, 1994-2001, at 3-4 (Apr. 15, 2002) (unpub-
lished manuscript, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=310419 (last visited June 28, 2009)).
102. See Black et al., supra note 17, at 1739-42 (reexamining the pitfalls of mass priva-
tization and share consolidation in the Russian and Czech contexts).
103. See source cited infra note 158.
104. See generally STEPHEN GREEN, CHINA'S STOCKMARKET: A GUIDE TO ITS PRO-
GRESS, PLAYERS AND PROSPECTS 9-36 (2003) (providing an important account of the events
leading up to the establishment of the exchanges in 1990 and 1991).
105. Cheng Guo et al., Understanding the Chinese Stock Market, 18 J. CORP. AccT. &
FIN. 13, 14 (2007).
106. Lihui Tian, Government Shareholding and the Value of China's Modem Firms 33
(Univ. of Mich. William Davidson Instit., Working Paper No. 395, 2001).
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vestment portfolios and hedge future risk. This section will review the
reform processes that led to the creation of China's equity markets and
highlight certain unique characteristics that have and will likely continue
to color the markets' evolution. While the future evolution of Chinese
corporate governance remains to be seen, the firms that populated
China's financial markets at their inception offered a significant contrast
to the "standard" shareholder-oriented model characteristic of developed
world, capitalist economies.,07
A. The SOE Problem
The failure of the state-owned sector constituted the main challenge
motivating the architects of China's "gradualist" approach to economic
reform. Although the first signs of a market economy bubbled up from
local initiatives in the agricultural sector,' 8 central authorities recognized
at an early stage that the reform program had to address the underper-
formance of the state-owned sector.' 9 The state-owned sector was too
large, and its social and political significance too great, to allow the
long-run trend of declining efficiency to persist.
The SOE problem has dominated Chinese law and policymaking
during the reform era (1978 to the present)."0 Until 1998, the Communist
Party Central Committee or provincial committee determined the ap-
pointment, promotion, or dismissal of senior managers of large SOE and
enterprise groups."' Managers rotated through a revolving door between
enterprise and government postings as they moved up the political
ranks." 2 Traditionally, under the planned-economy, SOEs received all
107. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Conver-
gence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641 (1999) (positing
that globalization may effect a high degree of convergence through corporate migration and
stock exchange harmonization); Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Con-
vergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001) (distinguishing between
"formal" convergence and "functional" convergence); Henry Hansman & Reiner Kraakman,
The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2000) (arguing for convergence
toward a single standard model of corporate governance). But see Lucian Arye Bebchuck &
Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52
STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999) (presenting a theory of "path dependence" of corporate governance
structures).
108. See generally BARRY NAUGHTON, GROWING OUT OF THE PLAN: CHINESE ECO-
NOMIc REFORM, 1978-1993, at 137-68 (1995).
109. Id. at 100 (describing the initial enterprise reform plan as conceived by Xue Muqiao
and his cohorts as early as December 1979 and August 1980).
110. Some commentators have even called the traditional SOE "the most important form
of economic organization in modem Chinese history." See Clarke, supra note 10, at 8.
Ill. STOYAN TENEV ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ENTERPRISE REFORM IN
CHINA: BUILDING THE INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN MARKETS 23 (2002).
112. Beginning in the late 1990s, certain municipalities and provinces began to experi-
ment with various levels of indirect state control, largely exercised by state-authorized
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funding from various government bureaus, and banks allocated the funds
to firms according to government direction."13 Money received directly
from its government administrative unit was called a grant; money re-
ceived from a bank was called a loan. Regardless of whether grant or
loan, firms operated under a soft budget constraint and were under no
real pressure to demonstrate a profit or repay."' Insofar as there was a
"capital market," firms competed for capital in political and bureaucratic
fora.
Ideological and institutional constraints, including the absence of
property rights and a rule of law tradition, ruled out a program of mass
privatization for China. '1 5 Rather than immediately undertake the com-
plex task of importing and implementing Western-style market
institutions, the policy response was to preserve the state-owned sector
but implement a leaner, more market responsive variant of state owner-
ship. For example, SOE reform during the 1980s focused on delegating
more managerial authority to the enterprise level. " 6 The reforms also
reduced the share of output from the state plan. Production in excess of
certain fixed targets could be sold at market prices at management's dis-
cretion."
7
While these initial reforms sensitized enterprise management to
market forces, significant problems still remained. First, the reforms
failed to establish uniformly market-determined prices." 8 Continuing
price controls forced many firms to operate at a loss. Moreover, the dual-
track price system created enormous incentives for corruption." 9 Trans-
ferring a good outside of the plan could exponentially raise its price.'
Separately, the insistence that financial contracts with relevant ministries
be negotiated on an enterprise-by-enterprise basis precluded the devel-
opment of a modern tax system with rates applied uniformly and
municipal or provincial-level holding companies. See id. at 25-26 (describing the so-called
"Shenzhen-Shanghai Model").
113. NICHOLAS R. LARDY, CHINA'S UNFINISHED ECONOMIC REVOLUTION 60 (1998)
("[I]nvestment was financed predominantly from interest-free budgetary grants [and to a lesser
extent].., loans to state-owned firms to finance their investment in fixed assets and ... work-
ing capital needs.").
114. See JANOS KORNAI, ECONOMICS OF SHORTAGE 302-14 (1980); Janos Komai, The
Soft Budget Constraint, 39 KYKLOS 3 (1986).
115. See LARDY, supra note 113, at 2 1. For an in-depth account of the debates on reform
strategy, see NAUGHTON, supra note 108, at 187-96.
116. See LARDY, supra note 113, at 22.
117. NAUGHTON, supra note 108, at 202.
118. LARDY, supra note 113, at 23; see NAUGHTON, supra note 108, at 228.
119. NAUGHTON, supra note 108, at 230 ("The dual-track strategy ... present[ed] a
particularly rich menu of temptations to corruption.").
120. Id. at 230-3 1.
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impartially.'2 ' Furthermore, between 1977 and 1993, employment in the
state sector rose by almost 40 million and finally stabilized at just over
110 million.' 22 Throughout this period, total factor productivity declined
and profits fell.' 23 By 1996, the state-owned sector profits as a percent of
GDP was less than one percent. '24
The low level of profits translated to meager retained earnings, and
consequently, SOEs relied heavily on credit to finance working capital
needs.' 25 Under these circumstances, the four large, state-owned banks
refused to hold SOEs accountable for their debts, and the status quo ante
soft budget constraint and failure to monitor perpetuated. 26 The Provi-
sional Enterprise Bankruptcy Law passed in 1986 and, although
specifically applicable to SOEs, was rarely applied.'27 Political concerns
about unemployment and social stability led to reluctance to allow liqui-
dation of loss-making state-held firms. China's banks held a massive
portfolio of non-performing loans and became technically insolvent.'
28
B. Corporatization (Not Privatization)
In the midst of this crisis, economic reformers turned to the stock
markets as an alternative to bank lending to provide new sources of capi-
tal to the state sector. Chinese domestic savings represented a
tremendous capital resource. The stock markets could serve as a conduit
to channel domestic savings and passive foreign investment into the ail-
ing SOEs. Traditionally, banks functioned as the worst kind of
intermediary. Savings were deposited in state banks, and the banks in
turn channeled the money to underperforming SOEs as loans. With no
monitoring, most of these loans became bad debts. The hope was that the
stock market as a new kind of intermediary could induce an efficient al-
location of capital. 29
These ideas arose in tandem with a new round of reforms designed
to separate the business and administrative functions of SOEs. In 1993,
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress passed the
121. Id. at 228-29.
122. LARDY, supra note 113, at 26.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 34.
125. Id. at 39-43.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 23.
128. In 2006, an audit by a major international accounting firm estimated China's non-
performing loans (NPLs) as over USD $900 billion. See Tian & Estrin, supra note 8, at 464.
These bad loans were a legacy of the reform period-not of the planned economy. Id.
129. See generally LARDY, supra note 113.
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Company Law. 30 The stated intent of the 1993 Company Law was to
introduce "diversified" forms of ownership and thereby impose a frame-
work of modem corporate governance on state-owned firms.' An SOE
could be converted into a joint stock company (gufen youxian gongsi), a
limited liability company (youxian zeren gongsi), or classified as a
wholly state-owned company (guoyou duzi gongsi)-the latter essen-
tially an SOE holdover and subgenre of the limited liability company.
Symbolic pillars of Chinese industry, "enterprises owned by all the peo-
ple" (quanmin suoyouzhi qiye) were transformed into enterprise legal
persons formed as companies.
The ideological limitations embodied in the Company Law are worth
emphasizing. 2 Critically, corporatization was never privatization.' Own-
ership of SOEs was disaggregated into share participation in newly
established legal persons. With the relevant approval, a small percentage
of those shares might be issued to the public on a national or overseas
stock exchange for corporate finance purposes. The State, however, in-
sisted upon maintaining a controlling stake-usually as much as 75-85
percent.'m Corporatization was specifically designed to avoid privatiza-
tion. Non-state investors could not easily obtain control of corporatized,
listed SOEs because the State retained an overwhelming majority of
shares in the company. These state-held shares carried restrictions on
ownership and transferability."' Shares retained by the State in an IPO or
owned by the State in non-public joint stock companies were designated
"state shares" (guoyou gu). 36 Similarly, "legal person shares" (faren gu)
were typically held by the SOEs and financial institutions that contrib-
130. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa [Company Law of the People's Republic
of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, effective
July 1, 1994) 1994 ZHONGGUO FAL0 NIANJIAN [1994 LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA]. The Com-
pany Law was substantially amended in 2005. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa
[Company Law of the People's Republic of China] (amendments promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006), 2006 ZHONGGUO FALO
NIANJIAN [2006 LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA].
131. LARDY, supra note 113, at 24.
132. TENEV ET AL., supra note 111, at 5 (noting the "important shift in ideology" that
accompanied China's market-oriented reforms and concomitant corporatization strategy).
133. See Nicholas C. Howson, The Doctrine that Dared Not Speak Its Name: Anglo-
American Fiduciary Duties in China's 2005 Company Law and Case Law Intimations of Prior
Convergence, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 209 (Hideki Kanda
et al. eds., 2008) (describing China's adoption of the corporate form as "mere corporatization
rather than privatization").
134. For an excellent analysis of the (conflicting) goals of the Company Law and the
corporatization project, see Donald C. Clarke, Corporate Governance in China: An Overview,
14 CHINA ECON. REV., 494, 497-500 (2003).
135. Id.
136. CARL E. WALTER & FRASER J.T. HOWIE, PRIVATIZING CHINA: THE STOCK MAR-
KETS AND THEIR ROLE IN CORPORATE REFORM 77-78 (2003).
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uted capital to the restructuring before the IPO.'17 State shares could not
be traded on the stock exchanges, and legal person shares could only be
traded between legal persons." Until recently, the typical shareholding
pattern in listed companies was about 30 percent each for the State, legal
persons, and domestic shareholders (holders of RMB-traded public
shares), and 10 percent for foreigners and employee shareholders.'3 9
C. Corporate Governance with Chinese Characteristics
This history brings into sharp relief several characteristics particularly
relevant to the Chinese case. While a high level of ownership concentra-
tion is actually the norm outside the context of Anglo-American common
law systems, the identity of the controlling shareholder in China-the
State-is distinctive." This fact has had important second order implica-
tions. Large shareholders under certain circumstances will monitor firm
managers, since it is in their economic interest to ensure that managers
maximize profits.'4 When the large shareholder is a state body, however,
the absence of an ultimate human principal with rights to residual earn-
ings makes for an ineffective monitor.4 2 The State may have social or
political goals that take priority over profit-maximization, e.g., prevent-
ing unemployment or developing a strategic industry sector.14 Even if
the State did prioritize profit-maximization, the agents of the State dele-
gated with the actual monitoring responsibility often have interests that
diverge from their principal-they may be subject to local influences,
and bureaucratic command structures may not be clearly defined.'"4
Other conventional pressures toward achieving the profit-
maximization norm include a reasonably efficient capital market and an
active market for corporate control, but particularities of the Chinese
case substantially undermined these pressures. 14 In countries with high
ownership concentration, controllers invariably enjoy certain private
benefits of control, such as "the perquisites enjoyed by top executives"
or the "psychic" value some shareholders attribute to simply being in
137. Id.
138. Id. at 80.
139. Xiaonian Xu & Yan Wang, Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in
Chinese Stock Companies, 10 CHINA ECON. REv. 75, 76 (1999).
140. See La Porta et al., Law & Finance, supra note 3, at 1146-48.
141. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J.
FIN. 737, 754-55 (1997) (discussing how large investors reduce agency costs).
142. Donald C. Clarke, The Role of Non-Legal Institutions in Chinese Corporate Gov-
ernance, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 168, 179 (Hideki Kanda
et al. eds., 2008) (describing the "absent owner" (suoyouzhe quewei) phenomenon).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 179-80.
145. See id. at 180.
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control. 4 6 Controllers should want to assure investors that they will not
engage in tunneling or other corporate misfeasance since such conduct
will lead to discounted share prices. If share prices decline, then the
company will have to issue more shares in order to raise capital, and this
will lead to dilution and loss of control. Discounted share prices may
also leave the company vulnerable to a takeover. However, Chinese
state-controlled firms could readily obtain financing from the state-
controlled banks,' 7 so they did not need to rely upon the equity markets.
Furthermore, because typically over three-quarters of the firm's equity
holdings were illiquid state-held blocks, independent parties were hard-
pressed to mount a successful takeover.' 8
Courts and administrative agencies might also play a disciplining
role. As in all cases of high ownership concentration, a crucial chal-
lenge of corporate governance is combating horizontal agency costs.
However, since the large shareholder engaging in opportunistic behav-
ior was a state actor, impartial disciplining was exceedingly difficult.
The state shareholder typically received preferential treatment from the
courts. 49 The intermediate people's court in the jurisdiction of the de-
fendant's domicile generally adjudicated securities fraud cases.'5° The
146. See Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An Interna-
tional Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537, 540-43 (2004) (introducing a theoretical framework to
measure private benefits of control).
147. See supra Part II.A. Interestingly, "private benefits of control are highest in former
communist countries ... " Dyck & Zingales, supra note 146, at 588.
148. See Clarke, supra note 142, at 180 ("So far, at least, there is no hostile takeover
activity to speak of in China").
149. The flaws of the Chinese judiciary-most notably, a lack of independence-are
well documented. See, e.g., TENEV ET AL., supra note 11l, at 21 ("[L]ocal authorities have
appointive and financial power over judicial and law enforcement departments and may ob-
struct enforcement of court judgments."); see also Clarke, supra note 134, at 503 ("Chinese
courts are not politically powerful and are hence reluctant to take cases involving large sums
of money and powerful defendants."). But see Howson, supra note 133, at 198 ("Chinese
courts have proven perfectly willing and technically able to invoke and enforce, on their own
and without statutory authorization ... basic corporate fiduciary duty norms.").
150. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa [Civil Procedure Law of the
People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar.
9, 1991, effective upon promulgation) art. 22 (geographical jurisdiction); Zuigao Renmin
Fayuan Guanyu Shouli Zhengquan Shichang Yin Xujia Chenshu Yinfa de Minshi Qinquan
Jiufen Anjian Youguan Wenti de Tongzhi [A Notice by the Supreme People's Court on Issues
Related the Pleading Requirements of Private Right of Action Involving False or Misleading
Statement on the Securities Markets] (issued by the Sup. People's Ct., Jan. 15, 2002) art. 5,
TIANYA FALO WANG, available at http://www.hicourt.gov.cn/law/show.asp?fileno=1045 (last
visited June 28, 2009) [hereinafter SPC Second Circular]; Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu
Shenli Zhengquan Shichang Yin Xujia Chenshu Yinfa de Minshi Peichang Anjian de Ruogan
Guiding [Several Rules by the Supreme People's Court on the Adjudication of Civil Damages
Cases Arising from False Disclosure Involving Securities] (issued by the Sup. People's Ct.,
Feb. 1, 2003) art. 9 translated in 2004 ZHONGGUO FALO NIANJIAN [2004 LAW YEARBOOK OF
CHINA] [hereinafter SPC Rules].
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listed corporation was generally owned and controlled by the local
government where the court sat, and judges owed their positions to
these very same authorities."' Finally, the public regulator was put in
the awkward position of having to pose as "policeman" and "cheer-
leader" of the market at the same time. On the one hand, the regulator
served to make rules, monitor market players, and carry out enforce-
ment actions to ensure that information disclosures were credible and
the market functioned efficiently. On the other hand, it was politically
important that SOE stock continued to trade at a high price. The securi-
ties markets were conceived to facilitate transfers of capital to the
state-sector and to advance the State's political and social objectives.
Clamping down on self-dealing, or obstructing the flow of funds into
the markets from illegal sources (e.g., market manipulation), thus often
harmed the interests of state actors.
III. THE CHINESE PUZZLE
Given the accepted institutional preconditions for strong securities
markets and the particular motivations for securities markets in China,
China's success appears counter-theoretical. Chinese legal institutions
were weak and enforcement was unpredictable. Disclosure require-
ments were violated with some frequency. 152 High profile media
expos6s revealed reputational intermediaries' involvement in schemes to
defraud investors.'53 In the IPO context, the circumstances were ripe for
promoters to abscond with their newly acquired equity capital, which
happened with some frequency. Indeed, the promoter's problem was ba-
sically institutionalized. 114 SOEs underpriced their shares, allowing
151. See STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO
263-66 (1999) (discussing the influence that the local party-state wields over courts).
152. See ZHU SANZHU, SECURITIES REGULATION IN CHINA 107-10 (2000) (discussing
enforcement of disclosure requirements).
153. See, e.g., Peter Montagnon, China Blames Two Firms for Bonds Scandal, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 1995, at 5 (reporting that China's second largest securities firm was found to
have willfully violated trading rules by rigging prices and manipulating the treasury bond
futures market); Tony Walker, China Plans to Resume Bond Futures Trading, FIN. TIMES, Apr.
24, 1996, at 26. Market manipulation was known to be widespread in the equities markets. For
a thorough analysis by the Chinese-language media outlet at the forefront of investigative
reporting for financial news, see Ping Hu & Li Qing, Jijin Heimu, Guanyu Jijin Xingwei de
Yanjiu Baogao Jiexi [Behind the Dark Curtain: Research Report and Analysis on Fund Behav-
ior], CAlJING, Oct. 2000, available at http://news.hexun.com/2008-09-14/108855569.html
(last visited June 28, 2009).
154. Professor Barry Naughton cogently characterizes this "institutionalized corruption"
in terms of a "triangle of interests" including the SOEs and their patrons, the securities
companies, and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) itself. See Barry
Naughton, The Politics of the Stock Market, CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR, Summer 2002, at
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favored insiders to buy low and sell quickly at the higher market price.
An initial price "pop" was generally assured because the government
limited the annual share issuance (through the quota system).'55 In the
post-IPO stage, self-dealing by a state-affiliated dominant shareholder
was similarly easy. Large shareholders of corporatized SOEs diverted
cash for their own personal consumption by siphoning off and selling
assets or utilizing bankruptcy to liquidate while leaving priority credi-
tors' claims unsatisfied.
5 6
Nonetheless, asset stripping in China never reached the degree of
egregiousness as in Russia or other former Soviet Union countries,'57
and the adverse selection death spiral never really occurred. Instead,
China's stock markets showed exceptional growth during the 1990s
according to the World Bank.5 8 While Part IV will offer a partial ex-
planation for China's success, this Part first lays the foundation through
a more rigorous analysis of the performance of China's stock markets
and of the impact (or lack thereof) of China's "core" institutions.
A. Interlude: The Former Soviet Union Cases Considered
According to conventional wisdom, the conditions in China should
have sapped the vitality of the financial markets. Widespread "tunnel-
ing" in the Czech Republic-once a darling of Western legal
academia9--decimated the Prague Stock Exchange within five years
following that country's privatization overhaul.'6° Perhaps more fa-
mously, the Russian financial markets, notwithstanding a corporate law
that was reputably "self-enforcing,"'' 6 fell prey to a cadre of klep-
6-7, available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/clm/issues/2906711.html (last visited
June 28, 2009).
155. GREEN, supra note 104, at 162-64 (arguing that controlling share volume and sys-
tematic underpricing assured the success of SOE IPOs).
156. See TENEV ET AL., supra note I 1l, at 22.
157. Id. at 23.
158. See China: The Emerging Capital Market 1 (World Bank, Rep. No. 14501-CHA,
1995) [hereinafter World Bank].
159. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Institutional Investors in Transitional Economies:
Lessons from the Czech Experience, in I CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND
RUSSIA: BANKS, FUNDS, AND FOREIGN INVESTORS Ill (Roman Frydman et al. eds., 1996).
160. See Black et al., supra note 17, at 1790-97.
161. For the seminal article outlining this model, see Bernard Black & Reinier Kraak-
man, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911 (1996). Professors
Black & Kraakman offer a sobered analysis a few years later:
The privatizers, ourselves included, underestimated the extent to which functioning
law requires honest courts and prosecutors that can redress gross violations. We
called the Russian company law that we helped draft a "self-enforcing" model be-
cause we thought that stating sensible rules could encourage corporate norms to
coalesce around those rules (even with minimal enforcement) .... Instead, self-
1298 [Vol. 30:1273
The Growth of China's Stock Markets
tocrats.' 62 These kleptocrats acquired the largest Russian SOEs from the
government for astonishingly low prices and then looted the compa-
nies' assets.
1 63
Like corporatization in the Chinese setting, privatization in former
Soviet States was designed to align the incentives of company manag-
ers and large shareholders with the company as a whole. Theoretically,
insiders would advance profit-maximization for the firm to maximize
their own personal returns. Of course, it did not turn out this way, and
at least two forms of adverse selection besieged the Russian market.
On one level, an unfriendly government bureaucracy resorted to puni-
tive taxation and corruption. '64 Moreover, since the threat of
expropriation or re-nationalization loomed large, managers looked to
maximize short-term gains. 65 In a hostile and uncertain environment
such as that, a controlling stake was worth more to a dishonest owner,
who would extract all of the firm's value, than to an honest owner, who
would gradually build value and share it with minority shareholders.
166
Managers would hide whatever earnings the firm did accrue, thereby
contributing to a severe lack of transparency and overall information
asymmetry.' 67 Consequently, government revenues did not improve,
bureaucrats continued their predatory practices, and the downward spi-
ral continued. On a second level, the fact that corporate financial
statements did not reflect a company's true health discouraged outside
dealing transactions were hidden, courts were of little help ... and managerial cul-
ture coalesced around concealing self-dealing instead of disclosure ....
Black et al., supra note 17, at 1756.
162. E.g., Black & Kraakman, supra note 161, at 1924-25 (describing how between
summer 1994 and late 1995 Russian share prices fell roughly 75 percent).
163. The Russian government bundled controlling stakes in many of the largest indus-
trial enterprises-in the oil and gas, electric power, and telecom sectors-into several holding
companies and then sold controlling stakes in those holding companies to a favored few. Black
et al., supra note 17, at 1741.
164. See id. at 1757-62 (discussing the various forms of punitive taxation and corrupt
practices by tax inspectors in Russia).
165. See id. at 1763-64.
166. See id. at 1737. But see Diana Yousef-Martinek et al., Yukos Oil: A Corporate Gov-
ernance Success Story?, CHAZEN WEB J. INT'L Bus. 3 (2003), http://wwwl.gsb.columbia.edu/
mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/715/Yukosproof.pdf (last visited June 28, 2009) (describing
the rise of Yukos CEO, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and his transformation "from 'corporate gov-
ernance nightmare' to poster child of the Russian market"). Not unlike the Russian stock
market, Mr. Khodorkovsky's rise was followed by a tumultuous fall: he was sentenced to eight
years in prison for fraud and tax evasion in 2005. See Times Topics: Mikhail B. Khodork-
ovsky, Last Updated Mar. 3, 2009, http://topics.nytimes.comtop/reference/timestopics/
people/klmikhail b_khodorkovsky (last visited July 16, 2009).
167. The threat of expropriation in Russia during the 1990s was so dire that managers
resorted to extensive barter chains rather than leave a record of financial transactions. Black et
al., supra note 17, at 1757.
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investment.' 68 Outside investors who bought shares saw their shares'
value decline as a result of rampant self-dealing and quite rationally sold
their shares hoping to cut their losses. 69 An environment of acute risk
aversion such as this gave little reason to issue shares on the exchanges,
and so the viability of the market spiraled downward in lockstep.
True, China corporatized, and has been privatizing gradually, while
the former Soviet Union countries typically engaged in accelerated pri-
vatization. However, these two divergent paths cannot be reduced to
mere speed of privatization. Professor Black and his co-authors suggest
that a poor institutional environment, regardless of the pace of privatiza-
tion, will lead to crippling self-dealing. They point to Ukraine, which has
been slow to privatize but has suffered an economic fate even worse than
that of Russia.7 ° Decoding the forces that made China's stock markets
work requires an in-depth look at China's institutional environment.
B. China's Development of "Core" Institutions
China's development of the so-called "institutional preconditions"''
for strong securities markets started late and evolved in a series of
(sometimes violent) fits and starts. State intervention in the economy is a
deep-seated intellectual current going back millennia.' 72 In the 1870s,
China's first wave of modern, profit-oriented private enterprise was
sponsored and supervised by provincial governors-general. '7' Local gov-
ernments could be considerably intrusive toward business. For example,
they might enforce a range of licensing and tax requirements to extract
fees and rents. Officials' involvement in early joint-stock experiments
provided shareholders with property protection. '74 For the most part,
businesses were suspicious of the public as shareholders'7 ' and preferred
168. Id. at 1763.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1736.
171. Black, supra note 6.
172. The Legalists, a philosophical school that influenced the ruling elite during the Qin
Dynasty (221 BC-207 BC) and afterward, articulated the primary concern of the State as the
accumulation of wealth and power. See WELLINGTON K. K. CHAN, MERCHANTS, MANDARINS,
AND MODERN ENTERPRISE IN LATE CH'ING CHINA 67 (1977).
173. Id. at 69-70 (providing an account of the China Merchant's Steam Navigation
Company sponsored by Governor-General Li Hongzhang); see also CHI-KONG LAI, The Qing
State and Merchant Enterprise: The China Merchants' Company, 1872-1902, in To ACHIEVE
SECURITY AND WEALTH: THE QING IMPERIAL STATE AND THE ECONOMY, 1644-1911, at 139-
55 (Jane Kate Leonard & John R. Watt eds., 1991) (showing that while the State provided
financing through loans and forgiveness of debt, the two large shareholders wielded a signifi-
cant degree of autonomy in running the firm).
174. See William C. Kirby, China Unincorporated: Company Law and Business Enter-
prise in Twentieth-Century China, 54 J. ASIAN STUD. 43, 50 (1995).
175. As late as the second decade of the twentieth century, Chinese industrialists resisted
the formation of joint-stock companies. Competitive pressures from British-American To-
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mortgages, collection of rents, and land speculation over issuance of
shares as methods of raising capital. 76 This was notwithstanding the
promulgation of the Company Law in 1904 and the Ordinance Concern-
ing Commercial Organizations in 1914, which drew heavily on German
commercial law and allowed for limited liability joint-stock compa-
nies.' 77 For at least a decade before 1914, when the Shanghai Securities
Dealers Association was founded, company stock was traded in Shang-
hai teahouses with no standards of accounting or disclosure
whatsoever. 
78
The 1920s witnessed a golden age for the development of China's
securities markets. Self-regulating industry organizations such as the
Shanghai Native Bankers Association, the Shanghai Securities Bro-
kers/Dealers Association, and others emerged to bolster contract
enforcement, market conduct, and property rights and to fill the gaps left
by the struggling Guomindang State. 79 By 1921, more than 140 securi-
ties exchanges were in Shanghai, and 52 exchanges were scattered
throughout China's other major commercial hubs. 80 Standardized rules
and viable networks of financial intermediaries had begun to gel.
This foundation was summarily disassembled when Mao Zedong
came to power in 1949. The Cultural Revolution (1967-77) went further
and led to the dismantling of the formal legal system.'8 ' Unlike other
transition countries, China's market reforms during the last two decades
of the twentieth century did not establish a legal framework based on
private property rights.'82 The 1994 Company Law was clearly geared
toward enterprises with state-held ownership structures, and the raison
de tre of the stock markets and the 1999 Securities Law was to obtain
financing for the ailing state sector.
1. Disclosure
Not long after the establishment of the national stock exchanges in
the reform era, the letter of the law reflected a fairly comprehensive
bacco finally forced the most prominent Chinese cigarette manufacturer of the time to accept
begrudgingly the corporate form and issuance of equity shares. See SHERMAN COCHRAN, BIG
BUSINESS IN CHINA: SINO-FOREIGN RIVALRY IN THE CIGARETTE INDUSTRY, 1890-1930, at
96-102 (1980) (detailing the intra-familial debate surrounding the decision to incorporate the
Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Company).
176. Kirby, supra note 174, at 50.
177. Id. at 49.
178. Zhiwu Chen, Stock Market in China's Modernization Process-Its Past, Present,
and Future Prospects 15 (June 1, 2006) (unpublished working paper, on file with author).
179. Id. at 17.
180. Id. at 15-16.
181. See generally LUBMAN, supra note 151.
182. Protection of private property was not guaranteed by the Constitution until 2004.
See XIAN FA arts. 6, 13 (2004) (P.R.C.).
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disclosure regime;'83 the difficulty has been enforcement. By 1993, the
regulatory framework provided for disclosure concerning initial public
offerings as well as continuing disclosure in annual and interim
reports.' s In theory, a listed company that failed to comply with these
disclosure rules faced tough penalties. The rules called for administrative
sanctions ranging from fines to delisting.1
8
5
Regulators, however, struggled to effectively implement these dis-
closure requirements. The record of disclosure was particularly abysmal
during the 1990s. Listed companies frequently got away with ignoring
the rules. According to a 1994 report by the China Securities Regulatory
Commission, of the 183 companies listed on the domestic exchanges,
thirty-four companies submitted only abstracts of their annual report,
and fourteen companies did not submit annual reports at all.186 The re-
ports that were submitted contained substantial omissions and
irregularities. 187
The emphasis on administrative regulations may have been part of
the problem. By mandating disclosure of a discrete list of items, law-
makers may have led issuers to believe that information not expressly
stipulated in the regulations did not need to be disclosed. Of course,
formulating a list of all information relevant to investors is impossible-
hence the utility of an undefined "materiality" standard. The situation
improved somewhat with the promulgation of the Securities Law in
1998, which stated that otherwise unknown "major events" (zhongda
shijian) that could have a "material effect" (chansheng jiao da yinxiang)
183. The Company Law required listed companies to publish a financial accounting
report every half year. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa [Company Law of the
People's Republic of China] art. 156 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, effective July 1, 1994) 1994 ZHONGGUO FALO NIANJIAN [i994 LAW
YEARBOOK OF CHINA]. Provisional regulations set out more detailed requirements, mandating
the reporting of price sensitive information in interim reports and annual reports. See, e.g.,
Gupiao Faxing yu Jiaoyi Guanli Zanxing Tiaoli [Provisional Measures for the Administration
of the Issuing and Trading of Securities] (promulgated by the State Council, Apr. 20, 1993,
effective immediately upon promulgation) arts. 57-67, 1994 ZHONGGUO FAL0 NIANJIAN
[1994 LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA] [hereinafter 1993 Provisional Measures on Share Issuing].
184. 1993 Provisional Measures on Share Issuing, supra note 183, art. 57.
185. Id. art. 74. Moreover, with the amending of the Criminal Law in 1997, company
managers directly responsible for false reporting could serve up to seven years in prison. See
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa [Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China]
(amended Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997) arts. 158-69, 1998 ZHONGGuO FALU NIAN-
JIAN [1998 LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA] (imposing criminal liability for violations of the
Company Law).
186. Xin Zhen, Cushi Shangshi Gongsi Guifanhua Yunzuo: Zhengiianhui Jiaqiang
Zhengquan Shichang Xinxi Pilu Guanli [Encouraging Regulatory Compliance for Listed
Companies: CSRC Strengthens Oversight over Information Disclosure for the Securities Mar-
kets], RENMIN RBAo [PEOPLE's DAILY], July 19, 1994, at 2.
187. Id.
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on a listed company's share price should be promptly reported. 81 In any
case, uncertainty on the part of issuers over what constituted a "major
event" still probably contributed to the high level of noncompliance
which, in turn, made consistent enforcement administratively difficult.'8 9
2. Reputational Intermediaries
Many commentators have suggested that, in the Chinese context, the
classic reputational intermediaries are ill-suited to serve as gatekeep-
ers.190 A series of scandals rocked the markets during the 1990s, and the
role of bankers, accountants, and lawyers in aiding and abetting fraud
and market manipulation left these intermediaries with precious little
reputational capital.' 9' The major state banks were the promoters of the
three national brokerages, which were all implicated in collaborating
with manipulators by taking up shares on inside information and taking
parallel proprietary positions.' Even joint venture and foreign account-
ing firms, apparently, were not innocent."' While there have been very
few publicized cases of lawyers aiding and abetting fraud, this likely
188. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa [Securities Law of the People's Re-
public of China] adopted Dec. 29, 1998, effective July 1, 1999, art. 61 in 1999 ZHONGGUO
FALO NIANJIAN [ I999 LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA].
189. For a number of scholarly views on the definition of "false statement' see generally
Huan Xiding & Xu Qinzhong, Shilun Zhengquanfa Zhong de Xujia Chenshu [On False or
Misleading Statements in the Securities Law], 18 ZHENGFA XUEKAN [J. POL. Sci. & LAW] 22
(2001) (P.R.C.); Song Yixin, Xujia Chenshu Minshi Peichang Susong Zhidu Ruogan Wenti de
Sikao [Thoughts on Several Issues Regarding Rules Related to Securities Litigation Involving
False or Misleading Statements], 4 FALU SHIYONG 9 (2003).
190. See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 10, at 70 ("[T]he most glaring problem in China's
accounting system is the lack of independent, professional auditors, similar to the situation for
the legal profession."); Clarke, supra note 142.
191. Early on in the capital markets' development, China's second largest securities firm
was found to have willfully violated trading rules by rigging prices and manipulating the trea-
sury bond futures market. Such behavior was surely prevalent in the equities markets as well.
See Peter Montagnon, China Blames Two Firms for Bonds Scandal, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 22,
1995, at 5; Tony Walker, China Plans to Resume Bond Futures Trading, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 24,
1996, at 26.
192. In perhaps the most infamous example, a CSRC investigation revealed that mar-
ket manipulation by Lo Liang was facilitated by 125 securities firms. See WALTER &
HOWIE, supra note 136, at 156-58. For the Chinese media expos6, see Hu Shuli et al.,
Zhuangjia Lii Liang Zhi Yi [Speculator Lii Liang, Part 1] CAIJING, Feb. 5, 2001; Hu Shuli et
al., Zhuangjia Lii Liang Zhi Er [Speculator Lii Liang, Part 2] CAIJING, Feb. 5, 2001. For a
useful depository of articles on Lu Liang, see generally http://business.sohu.com/35/13/
column200331335.shtml (last visited June 28, 2009).
193. A joint venture accounting firm and a Hong Kong accounting firm were named
defendants in a B share case filed in the Intermediate People's Court of Shenyang for their
role in false statements made by a Shanghai-listed company. See Shenyang Zhongyuan Shenli
Jinggang B Gu An, Bimawei Fenzhi Jigou Cheng Beigao [Shenyang Intermediate People's
Court Hears Jinggang B Share Case, KPMG Branch Office to Be Named Defendant],
ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO HUDONG BAN [CHINA SECURITIES INTERACTIVE], Feb. 11,
2003, http://www.cs.com.cn/csnews/20030211/327462.asp (last visited June 28, 2009).
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reflects the low probability of sanctions rather than a clean record.'9"
Overall, the conduct of intermediaries hardly inspired confidence in in-
vestors.
The dysfunctional performance of reputational intermediaries is
partly explained by a number of historical, "soft" factors. Independent
bankers, auditors, and lawyers had few real antecedents in the pre-reform
era. After being disbanded during the Cultural Revolution, the Ministry
of Justice had to be reestablished in 1979. After little more than a dec-
ade, the educational standards for professionals remained low.'95 More
fundamentally, a deeply held suspicion of autonomous organizations and
monitoring by internal party apparati left intermediaries, and especially
lawyers, with a conflicted sense of their role in society.1
96
Reputational intermediaries also failed to police the market because
the law did not incentivize them to do so. Chinese lawmakers have
struggled to articulate a workable liability standard for accountants. The
State Council introduced a vague general tort for certification of false
financial information during the late 1980s.197 The 1994 package of re-
forms, which included the Company Law, also contained the Law on
Registered Accountants. Undefined terms and ambiguities in the lan-
guage, however, have made courts reluctant to accept financial fraud
cases and, if accepted, generally unwilling find in the plaintiffs' favor.'98
The 1993 Provisional Regulations for the Administration of the Issuing
and Trading of Securities, the precursor to the Securities Law, provided
for fines and administrative sanctions for accountants and lawyers,' 99 and
the 1999 Securities Law contained provisions imposing both administra-
tive sanctions and civil liability for false or misleading representations or
certifications in the course of securities issuance or trading.20 Intentional
or grossly negligent false certification of facts by lawyers, accountants,
194. Clarke, supra note 10, at 31.
195. See LUBMAN, supra note 151, at 151-60 (1999) (on the legal profession); TENEV ET
AL., supra note 111, at 120-23 (on the accounting profession).
196. See LUBMAN, supra note 151, at 159.
197. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuce Kuaijishi Tiaoli [People's Republic of
China Regulations on Registered Accountants], issued by the State Council, July 3, 1986, arts.
11, 27, in 1987 ZHONGGUOFALU NIANJIAN [1987 LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA].
198. Clarke, supra note 10, at 28-29; Xin Tang, Protecting Minority Shareholders in
China: A Task for Both Legislation and Enforcement, in TRANSFORMING CORPORATE Gov-
ERNANCE IN EAST ASIA, 141, 147 (Hideki Kanda et al. eds., 2008).
199. 1993 Provisional Measures on Share Issuing, supra note 183, art. 73.
200. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa [Securities Law of the People's Re-
public of China] adopted Dec. 29, 1998, effective July 1, 1999, arts. 161, 189, 202, in 1999
ZHONGGUO FALO NIANJIAN [1999 LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA]; see also Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa [Securities Law of the People's Republic of China], as amended
Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006, arts. 173, 223, in 2006 ZHONGGUO FALO NIANJIAN
[2006 LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA].
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and other intermediaries could, in theory, also lead to criminal prosecu-
tion.20' However, a recent inquiry affirmed that civil remedies and
administrative sanctions have been rarely imposed, and criminal pro-
ceedings have been only marginally more frequent."
3. Liability Standards and Private Enforcement in the Courts
Chinese securities laws have traditionally provided a weak basis for
civil liability.203 Courts have been wary of accepting securities cases be-
cause of the questionable legal foundation of investors' claims and the
politically sensitive nature of fraud perpetrated by state-affiliated dominant
shareholders .2  Not until the 2005 amendments to the Securities Law did a
statute acknowledge a private right of action for misleading statements or
omissions in issuance-related disclosures. After a spate of high profile
corporate scandals, investors responded with a surge of securities fraud
claims between 1999 and 2001.2° None of the claims brought and filed in
the people's courts as a result of insider trading, market manipulation, or
false statements were allowed to progress to the hearing phase. 7 The
popular upsurge, however, compelled the Supreme People's Court (SPC)
to issue three statements concerning shareholder litigation.208 The SPC
201. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa [Criminal Law of the People's Republic
of China] (amended Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997) art. 229.
202. See Clarke, supra note 10, at 29-30.
203. As a general matter, China has historically favored administrative and criminal
punishments. Zhiwu Chen, Capital Markets and Legal Development: The China Case, 14
CHINA ECON. REV. 451, 454 (2003). Even in the 2005 Securities Law, there are over thirty
administrative liability provisions, eighteen criminal liability provisions and only four provi-
sions that deal with civil liability. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa
[Securities Law of the People's Republic of China], as amended Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan.
1, 2006, arts. 173, 223 in 2006 ZHONGGUO FALIO NIANJIAN [2006 LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA].
204. Tianya Falii Wang, Gaofa Fuyuanzhang Li Guoguang Xishuo Guojia Jinrong An-
quan de Sifa Baozhang [Deputy President of the Supreme People's Court Li Guoguang Talks
in Detail About Judicial Protection of State Financial Safety], July 23, 2002, http://
www.hicourt.gov.cn/news/news-detail.asp?newsid=2002-7-24-9-20-38 (last visited June 28,
2009) [hereinafter SPC President Talk].
205. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa [Securities Law of the People's Re-
public of China], as amended Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006, art. 69, in 2006
ZHONGGUO FAL0 NIANJIAN [2006 LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA]. The 1998 Securities Law
provided for joint and several liability for directors, officers, and supervisory board members
of an issuer as well as underwriters but failed to state affirmatively that investors could sue to
obtain damages. See Nicholas C. Howson, Private Shareholders' Suits in the People's Repub-
lic of China-Making "Rule of Law" from the Bottom Up 17-18 (2007) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author).
206. Howson, supra note 205, at 7 (citing an unofficial statistic of "more than 5,000"
shareholder lawsuits filed between mid-1999 and mid-2001).
207. See generally SPC President Talk, supra note 204.
208. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu She Zhengquan Minshi Peichang Anjian Zan Buyu
Shouli de Tongzhi [Notice on the Temporarily Ban on Securities Related Civil Damages
Cases] (issued by the Sup. People's Ct., Sept. 21, 2001), TIANYA FALO WANG, available at
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statements allowed aggrieved minority shareholders to sue issuers, domi-
nant shareholders, and secondary actors under the following procedural
framework.
a. The Limited Scope of the Private Right of Action
The SPC's Second Circular and the SPC Rules (chronologically, the
SPC's third statement) introduced a limited private right of action. The
Court determined that the lower courts could only accept false or mis-
leading disclosure cases.2° Other actions, such as insider trading, market
manipulation, and breaches of fiduciary duty remained "temporarily"
suspended.
b. The Prerequisite Requirement
The SPC Rules required that plaintiffs base their claims on a prior
administrative action or criminal judgment. 2 The China Securities
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), the Ministry of Finance (MoF), or an-
other empowered government agency would first have to issue a decision
regarding the conduct of directors, officers, supervisory board members,
or secondary actors. 21' Alternatively, investigation by the People's
Procuratorate, China's criminal prosecutor, could fulfill the prerequisite•212
requirement. The courts could hear a private shareholders' suit only
after such administrative action or criminal conviction.
The prerequisite requirement also had an evidentiary dimension.
Civil discovery was limited, and the evidentiary record in the civil trial
was derived from the prior proceedings.2 1 This was particularly trouble-
some because it allowed defendants to strike a settlement bargain with
the CSRC, the MoF, or the Procuratorate whereby the defendant
company would not submit to extensive discovery. Consequently, the
plaintiffs in the civil trial would have no basis upon which to state a
claim.
http://www.hicourt.gov.cn/law/show.asp?fileno=853 (last visited June 28, 2009) [hereinafter
SPC First Circular] ("temporarily" suspending the hearing of private shareholders' suits by all
Chinese courts); SPC Second Circular, supra note 150 (partially lifting the ban and so allow-
ing the first large representative action, to go forward); SPC Rules, supra note 150 (providing
a more comprehensive set of rules for shareholder litigation that clarified a number of the
ambiguities).
209. See SPC First Circular, supra note 208 (effectively banning all securities-related
civil claims); SPC Second Circular, supra note 150, art. I (allowing the courts to accept false
disclosure claims but not those arising from insider trading or market manipulation).
210. SPC Rules, supra note 150, arts. 5-6.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Song Yixin, supra note 189, at 9.
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c. Contingency and Other Fees
Chinese law allowed for a contingent fee arrangement."" Law firms
could calculate fees as a percentage of the client's net recovery."5 Plain-
tiffs would also have to pay a filing fee, determined according to the
amount in controversy2 6 Article 107 of China's Civil Procedure Law
(CPL) permitted courts to reduce or wave the filing fee where appropri-
ate. 7 For group actions brought pursuant to Article 55 of the CPL, the
losing party would pay (or reimburse, in the case of a plaintiff victory)
the filing fee.2 " As a result of the "loser pays" rule, small investors were
reasonably reluctant to serve as the class representatives since those peo-
ple might be left to bear the full cost of any unsuccessful litigation.
d. The Representative Action Mechanism
Although the SPC statements prevented even this narrow world of
shareholders' actions to proceed on a true "class action" basis, the rules
did provide for "opt-in" representative actions2 9 In cases in which nu-
merous parties had similar claims, courts would issue a public notice
describing the substance of the case and informing affected parties of
their right to register with the court within a specified period. Given the
214. However, as of 2006 contingent fees were no longer permitted for multiparty litiga-
tion. See Ltishi Fuwu Shoufei Guanli Banfa [Measures on the Management of the Collection
of Legal Fees] (issued by the State Development and Reform Comm'n & the Ministry of Jus-
tice, Apr. 13, 2006, effective Dec. 1, 2006), available at http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/
showl.php?file -id=109584 (last visited June 24, 2009).
215. See id. arts. 11, 13.
216. See Renmin Fayuan Susong Shoufei Banfa [Provisions for the Collection of Litiga-
tion Fees] (issued by the Sup. People's Ct., July 12, 1998), art. 5., available at http://
www.people.com.cn/zixun/flfgk/item/dwjjf/falv/9/9-1-1-06.html (last visited June 28, 2009).
217. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa [Civil Procedure Law of the
People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 9, 1991), art. 107,
translation in http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2694 (last visited June 28, 2009).
218. See Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Min-
shi Susong Fa Ruogan Wenti De Yijian [Opinion of the Supreme People's Court on Questions
Concerning the Implementation of the Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of
China] (issued by the Sup. People's Ct., July 14, 1992), art. 129, in 1993 ZHONGGUO FALU
NIANJIAN [1993 LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA] (the loser pays the filing fee).
219. Plaintiffs could proceed on a direct action (dandu susong) or joint action (gongtong
susong) basis. See SPC Second Circular, supra note 150, art. 4 (expressly forbidding "class
actions" (jituan susong)). Under Article 55 of China's CPL, joint action may accommodate a
potentially large number of plaintiffs, but a plaintiff must affirmatively opt-in to the represen-
tative class, and the group is generally fixed during a pretrial hearing. Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa [Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 9, 1991, effective upon
promulgation), arts. 53-55; cf FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (allowing, in the United States, for inclusive
representation of all affected parties except for individuals who affirmatively opt-out); Tang,
supra note 198, at 156 (arguing that a true class action mechanism in China is both "necessary
and possible").
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large number of plaintiffs in a typical securities action, such a require-
ment posed serious coordination problems. The SPC made a lukewarm
attempt to deal with this by requiring that plaintiffs authorize special
authority to their representative to amend, discontinue, or settle the
claim. °
Given the uncertainty and costs associated with civil actions, the
evidence strongly suggests that private enforcement has had little deter-
rence value. Since the first legal action filed in 1996, the number of
punishment decisions for disclosure violations has remained low. 2 In
2003, for example, the number of punishment actions was less than one
percent of the number of listed companies.
4. The Market Regulator and Public Enforcement
Public enforcement has been only moderately more effective in
regulating the markets. Since as early as 1993 the CSRC has been inves-
tigating market actors and issuing regulations relating to the issuance
and trading of securities. Until the promulgation of the 1999 Securities
Law, however, its authority was contested by rival agencies3.223 A Chi-
nese-language study covering the period from 1993 to 1998 shows scant
enforcement against misleading disclosures.224 During that period, the
CSRC reportedly issued a total of sixty punishment decisions relating to
securities issuance and trading (excluding futures).225 Only 26.7 percent
of these cases were against issuers, 43.3 percent were against securities
firms, and 8.3 percent were against other intermediaries 26
The 1999 Securities Law vested the CSRC with the primary power
to regulate the markets. In 2000 its nominal enforcement powers were
strengthened by a central enforcement bureau in Beijing and correspond-
ing enforcement offices in its regional branches.227 The number of
enforcement actions which have actually involved punishment by the
CSRC show that public enforcement has played only a marginal role in
China's stock market development. Anecdotal evidence supports the
220. See SPC Rules, supra note 150, arts. 14, 15.
221. According to one prominent securities lawyer, the number of investors that have
initiated securities-related suits is probably fewer than 10 percent of all those who have been
damaged and have standing to sue. Tang, supra note 198, at 147.
222. Clarke, supra note 10, at 59.
223. WALTER & HOWIE, supra note 136, at 60-62.
224. See Bai Jianjun, ZhengJianhui 60 ge Chufa Jueding de Shizheng Fenxi, [An Empiri-
calAnalysis of 60 CSRC Punishment Decisions], 11 FAXUE [LEGAL STUD.] 55, 62 (1999).
225. Id. at 55.
226. Id. at 58.
227. See GREEN, supra note 104, at 60.
228. See infra app. tbl.2 (summarizing enforcement data from 1998 to 2003).
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contention that CSRC enforcement actions have been susceptible to po-
litical influence.229
On the whole, it is clear that many core institutions that are suppos-
edly prerequisites for strong securities markets do not function
"properly." In terms of the LLSV shareholder rights index, China shows
up well below the average of other transition economies during the
1990s; in 1998, China scored a 3, compared to the average score of 3.61
for all other transition economies . 3°
C. China's Stock Market Performance
A comparison with other transition economies helps to fairly ap-
praise the performance of China's financial markets. These countries
share a legacy of central planning and extensive state ownership, and
most of them began to develop stock markets in the early 1990s. The
sheer size of China as measured in population and GDP poses challenges
when using the nation-state as a unit of comparison, but this can be par-
tially overcome by breaking out data on certain Chinese cities and
provinces. Several studies, including LLSV, utilize market capitalization,
number of listed firms, and number of IPOs as variables in measuring
firms' ability to raise capital on the market.3 Other scholarship on the
nexus between stock market development and economic growth has fo-
232cused on liquidity measures. Particularly for transition economies,
each of the standard measures of stock market development should be
understood with some caveats in mind.
With regard to market capitalization, stock prices in transitional
economies often do not bear a direct relationship to company value. Al-
though a listed company's financial records may have been translated from
socialist-era into market-based accounting standards, the information con-
tent often remains problematic. Restrictions on the transferability of a
large number of shares further distorts share price. This is clearly the case
229. For example, in the well-known case of Hainan Minyuan Modem Agricultural
Company, Minyuan effectively stonewalled the CSRC's investigation of that company's five
directors. The reason: Deng Xiaoping's son, Deng Pufang, headed the China Welfare Fund,
which owned 1.45% of the company's shares. See Daniel M. Anderson, Taking Stock in
China: Company Disclosure and Information in China's Stock Markets, 88 GEO. L.J. 1919,
1935 (2000).
230. See infra app. tbl.1.
231. See, e.g., La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 3; Stijn Claessens et al.,
The Future of Stock Exchanges: Determinants and Prospects, 3 EURO. Bus. ORG. L. REv. 403
(2002); Katharina Pistor et al., Law and Finance in Transition Economies, 8 ECON. TRANSI-
TION 325 (2000).
232. Levine & Zervos, supra note 2, at 537.
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in China where the effects of the huge overhang of non-tradable state
shares are well documented.233
The number of listed firms says little about the size of those firms
and thus says little about the value of the stock market to the economy as
a whole. Moreover, in transition economies, the number of listed firms
and the number of IPOs may be misleading because of the use of the
stock market for privatization. For example, the Czech Republic man-
dated that all SOEs list on the Prague Stock Exchange. Over 1,700 firms
were listed in 1994, yet illiquidity and corporate misfeasance contin-
ued 2 4 and by 1997 most of these firms were effectively delisted.23
Turnover velocity, defined as the total turnover for the year expressed as
a percentage of total market capitalization, may be a good measure of
liquidity,236 but a high turnover ratio may indicate speculation on the
market.237
Considering all of these measures, China's stock markets display
strong performance when viewed in a comparative perspective. Data on
fifteen transitional economies compiled by Pistor & Xu confirm this.
In terms of number of listed firms, China surpasses all of its competitors
save Romania, where the turnover ratio suggests a highly illiquid market.
Only two transition economies, Estonia and Russia, have a higher market
capitalization as a percentage of GDP, yet the figures of both of these
economies are dwarfed by the turnover figure for Shanghai alone. Over-
all, China's stock markets display the highest levels of liquidity, though
the high turnover ratios for Guangdong and Shanghai likely reflect
speculation. Finally, additional data shows that no country comes close
to China when judged in terms of total number of IPOs. In the period
from 1998-2001 alone, 414 IPOs took place in China, raising the
equivalent of US$ 61.6 billion,239 and this figure does not include the
numerous listings of Chinese companies on overseas exchanges. 24 0 These
233. See, e.g., Allen et al. supra note 10, at 70; WALTER & HowIE, supra note 136, at
77-87.
234. Pistor & Xu, supra note 15, at 187.
235. Id. at 187-88; see also Katharina Pistor, Law as a Determinant for Stockmarket
Development in Eastern Europe, in ASSESSING THE VALUE OF LAW IN TRANSITION ECONO-
MIES (Peter Murrell ed., 2001).
236. Allen et al., supra note 10, at 73.
237. Pistor & Xu, supra note 15, at 188.
238. See infra app. tbl.3.
239. Pistor & Xu, supra note 15, at 189-90; Anete Pajuste, Corporate Governance and
Stock Market Performance in Central and Eastern Europe: A Study of Nine Countries, 1994-
2001 (Apr. 15, 2002) (unpublished working paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
310419 (last visited June 28, 2009)).
240. See Jamil Anderlini, Chinese Overseas Listings Set to Increase, FIN. TIMES,
May 11, 2007, at 27, available at http://www.ft.comlcms/s/O/fO556bf6-ff5c-Ildb-aff2-
000b5df10621.html (last visited June 28, 2009).
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observations support the contention that China has outperformed all
other transition economies in its ability to raise capital.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNANCE AS
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Disclosure rules ineffectively resolve information asymmetry when
they are not credibly enforced and when there is no reasonable relation-
ship between the information disclosed and the firm's actual operation.
Like most transition economies, China has exhibited under-enforcement
of its securities laws, and companies have operated under non-market
standards. The reputational intermediaries that theoretically served to
collect and verify information often participated in rather than prevented
fraud. For the market to function, some mechanism was needed to in-
duce insiders to reveal critical information usable to select decent
companies for public offerings.
Two indigenous Chinese institutions brought about such a mecha-
nism: the quota system for equity share issuance and the ST system for
underperforming issuers. The quota system served two important func-
tions. First, it mitigated the serious information problems faced by
regulators and investors. Second, it incentivized local bureaucrats to se-
lect viable companies (or restructure companies to make them viable) at
the IPO phase. The ST mechanism built upon this same incentive struc-
ture to improve or sustain corporate performance in the post-listing
phase.
The economic reforms of the 1980s brought political decentraliza-
tion in an increasing number of decision-making areas. Local officials
became powerful political players able to bargain with the central gov-
ernment over the terms of their interactions .14 Localities lobbied for
exemptions to taxes and labor regulations in a "race to the bottom" to
investment. Political power was "fragmented" and localattract foreign ete  oi  s" amne"  a
241. See DALI L. YANG, BEYOND BEUING: LIBERALIZATION AND THE REGIONS IN
CHINA (1997) (offering a thorough account of regional relations and "competitive liberaliza-
tion"); see also YASHENG HUANG, INFLATION AND INVESTMENT CONTROLS IN CHINA: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS DURING THE REFORM ERA 1 (1999)
(detailing central and local controls over investment in plants and equipment to expand the
productive capacity of the economy).
242. See MARY ELIZABETH GALLAGHER, CONTAGIOUS CAPITALISM: GLOBALIZATION
AND THE POLITICS OF LABOR IN CHINA 6 (2005) ("In order to attract even greater amounts of
FDI, regions granted enterprises increasing managerial control and autonomy over labor prac-
tices.").
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governments were "entrepreneurial."2 43 The quota system for equity share
issuance and the ST system for underperforming issuers reflected this
dynamic of competitive liberalization in the financial sector.
A. The Logic of Indigenous Institutions
Quota systems were a basic feature of regional economic manage-
ment prior to and during the reform era.2" The central government
allocated quota for certain critical resources, such as energy,245 to the
provincial and municipal governments.4 6 Quota was applied to the finan-
cial markets from late-1991 to mid-2001,247 although in important ways
the system's legacy endures.248 In the tradition of economic planning and
administratively driven growth, the total value of new shares issued each
year was part of the national investment and credit plan.249
During the early years, the provincial-level branches of the People's
Bank of China (PBoC) liaised with their corresponding locality to reach
an estimate for the annual quota of equity shares issuance.250 The main
branch of the PBoC fixed the final quantity of quota in conjunction with
other central government organs, and then allocated it among the locali-
ties via the PBoC provincial-level branches 251 While, formally,
enterprises "applied" to the local governments for the opportunity to is-
sue shares on the exchanges, in practice the local governments chose
whatever companies they wished-invariably local government-owned
252or government-controlled enterprises .
243. See Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Introduction: The "Fragmented Authoritarianism"
Model and Its Limitations, in BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO
CHINA I (Kenneth G. Lieberthal & David M. Lampton eds., 1992).
244. See Zhiwu Chen, supra note 203, at 456 (arguing that planned growth has been at
the heart of the Chinese modernization process for over the past 150 years).
245. Pistor & Xu, supra note 15, at 196.
246. I refer to provinces and provincial-level municipalities as "localities' and to pro-
vincial government and provincial-level municipal government as "local governments." I refer
to the central government in Beijing as "the center."
247. Fang Liufang, China's Corporatization Experiment, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
149, 178 (1995) (describing the 1991 first stock issue quota to nine Shanghai companies for a
total of 130 million shares). By 1993, the system of allocating quota had become standardized.
Id. at 181.
248. Since companies selected for IPO under the quota system entered a queue, which
typically involved a two-year waiting period, the quota system defacto endured until at least
2002. Moreover, rather than moving to a registration system (as is common in developed mar-
kets), the quota system was replaced with an approval system whereby the CSRC screens all
applicants. Ministries and local governments continue to play a role in identifying and approv-
ing the selection of companies. Politics figures prominently in the process. See WALTER &
HOWIE, supra note 136, at 115.
249. World Bank, supra note 158, at 89.
250. Fang Liufang, supra note 247, at 179.
251. Id.
252. World Bank, supra note 158, at 89.
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By 1993, the PBoC no longer played the lead role, but the process
largely remained the same. The State Council Securities Policy Commit-
tee, the State Planning Commission, and the CSRC-the latter playing
an increasingly active role as time went on--determined the quota fig-
ure, subject to final approval from the State Council (China's executive
cabinet)."' These central government organs allocated quota among the
localities via the CSRC provincial-level branches.254
The apportionment of quota represented only the first tier of a multi-
tiered approval process.255 Once each locality had received its share of
quota and awarded it among its favored SOEs, the SOEs would have to
submit offering documents and financial statements for the past three
years to the CSRC for review in order to verify compliance with stan-
dards for assets, management, and profitability. 256 The process of
compiling the offering documents in the lead-up to the IPO notoriously
entailed funny accounting to meet listing criteria.257 Finally, after CSRC
acceptance, the exchanges themselves would have to approve the issu-
258
ance.
The rationale of the quota system appeared appropriate during those
early years. The quota mechanism facilitated ordered market entry and
allowed the government to maintain some control over the size and sta-
bility of the stock markets. Pent-up demand for investment capital would
have otherwise swamped the market with shares and populated the ex-
changes with bad issuers, which would likely have led to a death
spiral.259 Consistent with development goals, the quota mechanism also
allowed authorities to channel funds into certain sectors, such as natural
resources and utilities, and away from others, such as light industry and
real estate.2  Perhaps most importantly, the quota mechanism allowed
the government to restrict the flow of issued shares to keep IPO prices
high-which assured a suitable level of equity financing for the state
261
sector.
253. Fang Liufang, supra note 247, at 180.
254. Id.
255. Here I am referring to domestic A and B shares. The latter also required approval by
the Ministry of Foreign Technology and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC). Overseas listings
were not subject to quota. They required case-by-case approval by central authorities. See
GREEN, supra note 104, at 160-61.
256. See Zhiwu Chen, supra note 203, at 457.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See GREEN, supra note 104, at 161.
260. Political bias has endured today because of the CSRC's screening role of applicant
firms. See id. at 161-62.
261. But see Naughton, supra note 154, at 6-7, for a more nefarious interpretation of
IPO pricing.
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A quota system, however, has obvious distortionary effects on the
market, and China's quota system was damaging for at least two reasons.
First, the central government unabashedly used quota to manipulate the
market. To give a more benign example, to deflate what he believed to be
a speculative bubble in 1996, Premier Zhu Rongji simply announced an
increase in the following year's quota, and the market adjusted
accordingly. 62 Second, the quota system created tremendous opportunities
for rent-seeking and corruption. The limited supply of permits to issue
shares inflated the value of each permit. Companies would bribe local
officials to gain access to quota. Chinese media reports have
subsequently revealed that a number of companies avoided the quota
selection process altogether by bribing central officials.263
B. Quota and Incentive Structures During the IPO Phase
Despite its unconventionality, a growing body of empirical evidence
has shown that the quota system, on the whole, created incentive struc-
tures that benefited the financial markets. 26 Responsibility for collecting
and verifying the relevant information about listing firms was assigned
to the local government.16' Local government ownership of these firms
gave local bureaucrats the power to appoint management and request
information from management.266 Neither central authorities nor inves-
tors, however, could check the accuracy of this information.
Furthermore, critics rightfully have pointed out how the local govern-
ment owners routinely "cooked the books," since they had a direct
interest in the generation of equity financing. 67 On average, however, the
system worked to partially negate the promoter's dilemma.
The localities were players in a "repeat game" where the central
government offered carrots and wielded a stick. Positive performance on
one of the national stock exchanges brought tangible benefits for the lo-
cal government/owner beyond a one-time windfall gain of equity capital.
The CSRC rewarded the localities whose companies performed well on
the national exchanges with future quota.268 Controlling for regional size,
Pistor & Xu have found a positive correlation between performance in-
dicators of listed firms and the size of quota allocated in subsequent
262. GREEN, supra note 104, at 161.
263. The Chinese financial media reported that at least twelve companies from Jiangsu
Province, including Shanghai-listed Jiangsu Sunshine and Shenzhen-listed Wuxi Little Swan
had bribed regulators to gain market access during the 1990s. Id.
264. See, e.g., Pistor & Xu, supra note 15 (on the quota system); Du et al., supra note 15
(on the ST system).
265. Pistor & Xu, supra note 15, at 198-99.
266. Id.
267. For this sort of critique, see Zhiwu Chen, supra note 203, at 457.
268. See Pistor & Xu, supra note 15, at 200-03.
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periods. 69 Even powerful provinces such as Guangdong and Jiangsu re-
ceived comparatively low quota in the periods after their firms
performed below the national mean and median.70
Moreover, career advancement required that party cadres meet their
region's economic development targets.27' Good performance of regional
companies on the two major stock exchanges reinforced key social and
economic indicators. 2 Thus, a local bureaucrat's political fortune was
wedded to the performance of local SOEs. Equity financing made local
enterprises less dependant on regional budgets. On the other hand, when
its listed companies underperformed, local government/owners were pe-
nalized. The CSRC might order delisting or force the local
government/owner to bailout and restructure the company.73 Delisting
amounted to a retroactive reduction of previously allotted quota; no new
company could use that quota to issue shares.7 Lower quota would gen-
erally be allocated to that locality in the future. After 1998,
underperforming firms were required to file for ST status, which con-
strained the firm and subjected it to the possibility of takeover. 75 In sum,
the incentive structure created by the quota system functioned on two
levels. First, on a "vertical" level, the central government, generally em-
bodied by the CSRC, rewarded and punished local governments based
on the performance of their firms listed on the exchanges. Second, on a
"horizontal" level, the local governments competed for a finite quantity
of quota on an annual basis and sought to distinguish themselves in the
eyes of the CSRC and other influential central government actors.
The quota system effectively utilized state and party administrative
governance to select companies for listing on the national stock ex-
changes. It extended preexisting inter-locality competition into the area
of equity market entry. The system incentivized informed company in-
siders to list the better performing SOEs in their jurisdiction. 276
269. Id. at 200.
270. See id. at 201-02.
271. For an excellent account of the evaluation system (kaohe zhidu) for local cadres, see
Susan H. Whiting, The Cadre Evaluation System at the Grass Roots: The Paradox of Party
Rule, in HOLDING CHINA TOGETHER 101 (Barry J. Naughton & Dali L. Yang eds., 2004); see
also T NEV ET AL., supra note 11l, at 8 (referring to the bureaucracy as a "helping hand" for
economic development).
272. See TENEV ET AL., supra note 11, at 8.
273. Pistor & Xu, supra note 15, at 203-05.
274. Id. at 203.
275. See infra Part IV.C.
276. I am not suggesting that the companies ultimately chosen to list on the domestic
exchanges were ideal investments by any means. As I have argued, the whole point of corpora-
tization was to gain equity financing for failing SOEs. Clearly, the firms chosen to list were
the most politically privileged of firms. My point is simply that they were also often the best
of that lot, and restructuring made these firms relatively better still.
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Indigenous Chinese administrative governance served to mitigate the
severe information problems and reduced adverse selection during the
IPO. It is likely that administrative governance also helped to solve the
controller's dilemma in the post-IPO phase since seasoned equity offer-
ings also depended on a locality's apportionment of quota.
C. ST and Incentive Structures During the Post-IPO Phase
An important objection to a theory of administrative governance
based solely on the quota system is that, even if it did partially mitigate
the effects of information asymmetry, that success was short-lived. As
Pistor & Xu acknowledge, the evidence does not show that the quota
system curbed the moral hazard problem very far into the post-listing
phase.277 More than 90 percent of the violations on the Shanghai and
Shenzhen exchanges concerned post-IPO continuing disclosure; of these,
64 percent concerned ad hoc disclosure requirements violations."' In
1998, the CSRC answered this apparent failure of post-listing govern-
ance with the ST delisting mechanism."' Like the quota system, the ST
mechanism was an administrative governance tool. Utilizing a similar set
of preexisting incentive structures, it sought, with some success, to moti-
vate local governments to rescue ailing firms.
A listed company qualified for special treatment and would have
"ST" inserted in front of its listing number, if it displayed either: (1) net
losses for two consecutive fiscal years; (2) shareholder equity lower than
registered capital (the par value of the shares); (3) a negative opinion (or
inability to issue an opinion) by the auditors of the company's financial
statements; or (4) an abnormal financial condition, determined by the
stock exchanges or the CSRC. 2' 0 The ST designation imposed serious
constraints. The company's interim report would be audited, and daily
share price fluctuations would be limited to 5 percent to prevent market
manipulation. If an ST company continued to incur losses for more
than one year, it would be delisted 2
Local governments zealously resisted any effort to delist even their
poorest performing companies for two reasons. First, a locality typically
277. Pistor & Xu, supra note 15, at 207 ("The quota system has been less effective in
monitoring postlisting violations than ensuring prelisting selection.").
278. Id. at 207; Du et al., supra note 15, at 165. "Continuing disclosure," refers to an-
nual, quarterly, and current reports. "Ad hoc disclosure" refers to current reports announcing
major events.
279. Pistor & Xu, supra note 15, at 204.
280. Du et al., supra note 15, at 166.
281. See Anderson, supra note 229, at 1933.
282. This was the policy as of January 1, 2002. Before that date, losses in excess of one
year would lead to a further downgrade to "particular transfer" treatment, which dictated even
more restrictive measures. Duet al., supra note 15, at 166.
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bargained hard with the central government for its listing quota; second,
the very existence of quota and the restrictions on market entry meant
that a listed company commanded substantial "shell value." '283 Companies
otherwise excluded from the market would pay a premium to obtain con-
trol of a listed company and thereby gain access to coveted post-IPO
equity financing. The local governments for their part relied upon peri-
odic equity capital infusions and the huge economic rents brought by the
firm's shell value. Delisting would also constitute a substantial embar-
rassment (diu mianzi) for the local government-affiliated company
managers.M By threatening to delist a local government's underperform-
ing firm, the CSRC was threatening to kill the local government's golden
goose. The ST mechanism served in part to make that threat credible. By
making an ST designation, the CSRC also put itself under public scru-
tiny to fulfill its promise to hold the company's managers accountable.
Delisting served both specific deterrence and general deterrence aims.
For these reasons, local governments faced tremendous pressure to
rescue their ST firms. The local government-affiliated controlling share-
holder would present its firm management with a choice: develop a
workable restructuring plan or relinquish control to another party with a
more convincing plan. Local governments could be expected to make a
total effort. They might put administrative pressure on major creditors or
on state banks to forgive the ST firm's debts, indirectly subsidize the ST
firm by using fiscal revenues to purchase the firm's products, directly
grant the ST firm subsidies, or act as an intermediary to arrange an ac-
quisition deal.285
Attempting to escape the threat of delisting, most ST firms under-
286
went asset or share restructuring. In an asset restructuring, the ST firm
typically exchanged with large shareholders inferior assets for superior
assets. Value differences arising from the asset swap were exempted by
the large shareholders, allowing the ST firm to obtain the superior assets
at a highly discounted rate or without charge.287 In contrast to an asset
283. Pistor & Xu, supra note 15, at 207 ("Firms that had been excluded from the market
have discovered that buying up moribund shells of listed companies and inserting their own
assets can give them access to the financial markets."); Duet al., supra note 15, at 169 ("[Tlhe
stringent quota and quantity restrictions that the central government imposed ... created huge
economic rents for incumbent listed firms......
284. See Duet al., supra note 15, at 168.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 169.
287. Du et al. report the case of ST Zhang Jia Jie, designated an ST firm in 2002, as an
example of asset restructuring. Id. The firm swapped 140 million yuan of accounts receiv-
ables, other receivables, prepayments, and investment securities (i.e., bad assets) for 227
million yuan of superior assets from its controlling (state) shareholder without paying the
price difference. Id. The controlling shareholder forgave Zhang Jia Jie the 20 million yuan of
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restructuring, share restructurings involved an ownership change. In-
cumbent shareholders sold their shares to another company to cash out
the firm's shell value. Data from 1998-2003 shows that share restructur-
ings predominated for both Shanghai- and Shenzhen-listed ST
companies. 8 Restructurings and related corporate governance modifica-
tions, such as CEO changes, improved companies' operational
performance and in a significant number of cases allowed companies to
shed their ST status.2 9 The market responded to the ST system. In their
studies of company performance, Du, Liu, & Wong have found signifi-
cant, negative abnormal returns in the twenty-day period surrounding a
ST designation, but positive cumulative abnormal returns in the ten
months after ST designation.290
In sum, state control and institutions of administrative monitoring
buttressed share value in at least three ways. First, corporatization neces-
sarily involved large blocks of non-tradable state shares. The limited
supply of freely floating shares ensured that demand would be sufficient
for high initial returns. Second, in a sense, the State functioned as a repu-
tational intermediary: state control signaled to investors that their
investment was safe, and labeling a company "ST" intimated that a local
government bailout was on the way. Most interestingly, an elaborate sys-
tem of intra-government incentive structures, with both vertical and
horizontal dimensions, led to actual improvements in corporate govern-
ance and in the financial health of ailing firms. While Russian owners
rationally chose to loot rather than to restructure, Chinese owners faced
incentives that lured them in the opposite direction.
D. The Role of the CSRC
The CSRC was the nucleus of the administrative governance struc-
ture. The thesis of this Note depends largely upon the CSRC's role
consistently rewarding and punishing through quota distribution. Such
tremendous discretion concentrated in the hands of a regulator might
foster an environment where agency capture and corruption flourish. The
CSRC's powers, however, were subject to oversight. The State Council
directly monitored the CSRC, and as the highest executive organ, the
State Council was sensitive to the economic and social instability that
could result from mismanagement of the financial markets.29' Indeed, the
debt. Id. In essence, the restructuring led to 17.38 million yuan of net profits with earnings per
share of 0.095 yuan. This resulted in removal of the ST "hat" in 2003. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 172-73.
290. Id. at 166.
291. For example, the new Securities Law requires State Council approval of all CSRC
imposed conditions for listing. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa [Securities
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CSRC assumed its role as preeminent market regulator in 1999 after
market mismanagement and insider-dealing by the People's Bank of
China led to shareholders' riots in Shenzhen and elsewhere.2 In addition
to oversight from the State Council, the CSRC has also had to struggle
with the demands of the localities and the courts. As adversaries of the
CSRC in negotiations over quota, the local government recipients had
strong incentives to carefully monitor CSRC allocations and approvals
each year. When agency action appeared arbitrary, individual companies
occasionally challenged CSRC decisions in the courts. In one publicized
case, the Beijing High People's Court affirmed an intermediate court
holding that a CSRC rejection of a particular company's listing applica-
tion had no legal basis.293 The court ordered the CSRC to approve the
listing.29 These factors have not rendered the CSRC immune from favor-
itism and corruption, but they illustrate the reality that the CSRC has had
to contend with certain checks and balances.
CONCLUSION
This Note has offered a partial explanation for the improbably robust
development of China's equity markets. I have argued that during the
first decade of stock market development institutions of administrative
governance mitigated information asymmetry, casting local governments
as intermediaries that vouched for the quality of issuer firms. Local gov-
ernment sponsorship was an important signal for relevant central
government organs and for the investing public. When issuers performed
so poorly that their stock qualified for ST status, the localities were mo-
tivated to restructure or allow takeover by new owners with a plan for the
business that would raise the stock price. Taken together, these structures
staved off the adverse selection problem that crippled the former-soviet
transition economies. Indigenous Chinese institutions and practices filled
gaps left by substantive law, administrative regulation, and legal institu-
tions that had not yet completely taken root and, therefore, could not be
depended upon to provide real investor protection.
Law of the People's Republic of China], as amended Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006,
arts. 12, 13, in 2006 ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN [2006 LAW YEARBOOK OF CHINA].
292. See WALTER & HOWIE, supra note 136, at 59 (detailing the CSRC's "domestic
struggle").
293. In the Hainan-Kaili case, a company designated by Hainan Province to issue shares
was rejected by the CSRC. The Commission cited fraudulent financial reports and implied that
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The Chinese experience provides some useful insights for develop-
ing and transition economies seeking to establish capital markets. Before
adopting a catalogue of "core" institutions that make stock markets work
in developed economies-generally characterized by the common law
legal origin-policymakers in the developing world may do better by first
looking to cultivate and build upon indigenous institutions. Often, the
most viable institutions in transition economies are institutions of state-
guided growth and administrative governance. During the initial period of
market development, these state structures may offer a foundation upon
which to erect a stock market. Ideally, these indigenous institutions pro-
vide the initial support so that "core" legal institutions can gradually
share the burden of regulating the market and can grow into their proper
place, effectively combating the dual-threats of information asymmetry
and self-dealing. China's experience provides a modicum of promise that
this hope may yet become a reality.
The Growth of China's Stock Markets
APPENDIX
TABLE 1
LEGAL SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION 1998
















* A higher number indicates more developed formal law.
** A higher number indicates more developed regulatory quality.
Source: Pistor & Xu, supra note 15, at 191. Formal law is based on a "rule of law" indicator. See
LLSV, Law and Finance, supra note 3, at 1124. Regulatory quality is a World Bank governance
indicator. See Governance Matters, Worldwide Governance Indicators,




Year Enforcement actions taken Followed by Number of companies listed
by regulatory agencies* punishment on Shanghai and Shenzhen
Stock Exchanges
1998 3 3 853
1999 12 9 950
2000 16 7 1088
2001 71 9 1160
2002 62 8 1235
2003 51 11 1287
* "Regulatory agencies" include the CSRC, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, and
other government agencies.
Source: Pistor & Xu, supra note 15, at 195.
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TABLE 3
STOCK MARKET INDICATORS: CHINA AND TRANSITION ECONOMIES
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE COMPARED (2002)
Population Listed Total Tradable Turnover
(in 1,000) Firms Market market Ratio
Cap/GDP Cap/GDP
Bulgaria 7,707 354 .05 .03 28.4
Croatia 4,334 66 .2 .12 4.2
CzechRepublic 10,264 78 .28 .17 48.7
Estonia 1,423 14 .44 .26 5.5
Hungary 10,106 48 .25 .15 52.2
Latvia 2,385 62 .09 .06 17.6
Lithuania 3,611 51 .12 .07 13.5
Poland 38,634 216 .16 .1 22.4
Romania 22,364 4,870 .12 .07 12.2
Russia 290,349 196 .4 .24 36.1
Slovakia 5,415 354 .09 .06 46.1
Slovenia 1,930 35 .24 .15 27.9
Ukraine 48,760 184 .08 .05 5.7
China 1,275,389 1,235 .4 .16 67.6
Chongqing 30,513 26 .41 .14 65
Guangdong 85,225 138 .52 .16 331.7
Shanghai 16,408 144 1.61 .41 391.8
Source: Pistor & Xu, supra note 15, at 189.
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